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Western Michigan University 
This collection is based on the papers presented at the 2007–2008 
Werner Sichel Lecture-Seminar series held at Western Michigan Uni-
versity. These papers address the issue of globalization with a special 
emphasis on its impact on poverty. The dawning of the twenty-first 
century is a propitious time to examine this issue. Advances in trans-
portation and, especially, telecommunications have imposed virtual 
synchronicity on nations. Information and communication flows are 
virtually instantaneous. However, wide differences in cultures, politi-
cal systems, languages, and ethnicities impose barriers to optimal use 
of the technological advances that have occurred. Extreme variation in 
the international distributions of wealth, income, and poverty remain as 
enormous social problems to be addressed. 
The general perspective of the economists who have contributed to 
this collection of papers is that expanding “flows” between countries 
is the appropriate direction for economies both in terms of accelerat-
ing growth and reducing inequalities. These flows include international 
trade and capital, migration, remittances, and foreign aid. But in addi-
tion to these hard commodities and dollars, there are flows of ideas, 
knowledge, and technical assistance. Of course, as one of the authors 
reminds us, appropriate intellectual property rights need to be enforced 
concomitantly with the flow of ideas and knowledge. 
The book begins with the chapter by Ian Goldin and Kenneth A. 
Reinert, who explore how globalization in the structure of trade and 
capital flows in its various forms (foreign direct investment, portfolio 
investment, and commercial bank lending) affect poverty. They also 
discuss the effect of foreign aid, international migration, and remit-








Goldin and Reinert offer a historical view of globalization and 
describe three distinct stages of modern globalization, the first of which 
dates back to approximately 1870. In discussing the historical relation-
ship among these three stages, they note that globalization and global 
poverty can be either positively or negatively related to each other. 
From 1870 to 1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression, glo-
balization and global poverty increased together. However, the retreat 
from globalization during the Great Depression and World War II was 
accompanied by a continued increase in global poverty. A key public 
policy challenge facing humankind, they say, is to eliminate this still-
prominent level of extreme poverty. 
Goldin and Reinert write that while globalization has the potential 
to be a vehicle for shared growth, prosperity, and reductions in pov-
erty, that potential is not yet being adequately realized. They conclude 
their chapter with several recommendations to improve the effects of 
globalization. 
Chapter 3 by Susan Pozo emphasizes that globalization through 
migration is a powerful global force with potential benefits for indi-
viduals and community out-migrants. Pozo discusses the role of cur-
rent remittances and how these forms of capital inflows to developing 
countries have the potential to reduce sudden stops or shocks. In other 
words, countries that experience large inflows of remittances appear 
less vulnerable to economic recessions from sudden withdrawal of cap-
ital, assuming these inflows are motivated by altruism. Altruism inflows 
to developing countries are countercyclical, reducing the damage that 
foreign investors may impart when they perceive sudden shock in poor 
performance and withdraw financial resources. 
Pozo reminds us that free flows of capital where it is abundant 
should earn low returns to areas where it is abundant and earn higher 
returns where it scarce, as in developing countries. Globalization driven 
both by trade and capital flows generally leads to a positive sum out-
come, and not a zero sum game. The same idea is true for migration, 
which involves the flow of human capital. She concludes by arguing 
that despite political impediments to labor migration, migration and 
other forms of globalization driven by technical changes, trade, and 
capital flows are likely to lead to growth of the world economy with the 




Chapter 4 by Joseph Joyce explores the impact of globalization on 
income and wealth inequality. Joyce reviews the evidence on the deter-
minants of disparities in per capita income with a focus on the institu-
tions that affect globalization. He implies that globalization can be bet-
ter managed to benefit the poor. The United States and other industrial 
countries have a major responsibility to help promote globalization with 
a human face. In particular, the greatest challenge of global poverty and 
inequality exists in Africa and the Middle East in the coming century, 
with symptoms that pose serious global challenges: deadly conflicts, 
human rights abuses, terrorism, rebellion, and dictatorships. Overcom-
ing these challenges, Joyce says, will make a significant contribution to 
globalization and result in global peace, stability, poverty alleviation, 
and human security. 
Linda Tesar, in Chapter 5, examines how the composition of global 
and financial flows has changed and the role of the markets in the pro-
cess. She discusses the history of financial flows and their responses 
to the Washington Consensuses I and II. Washington I refers to policy 
recommendations by Washington-based global institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury, 
which recommended to developing countries to liberalize market prices 
by “getting prices right.” This policy later proved too limited and led to 
the Washington II Consensus of “getting institutions right.” 
Tesar shows the change in composition for global financial flows 
to emerging markets during the post–financial crisis period. External 
development finance is now more likely to take the form of a sale of 
domestic assets, with control rights shifting to the acquiring firm, which 
is a natural response to weak institutions in emerging markets. While 
control of foreign subsidiaries allows both for capital flow and for pro-
tection of property rights of the acquiring firm, it is not a substitute for 
strong institutions that would extend to all firms in emerging markets. 
The upshot is this: getting institutions right is critical to attracting FDI 
in developing economies. 
In Chapter 6, Lisa Cook investigates the issue of intellectual prop-
erty rights based on evidence from plant patents from 1977 to 2007 for 
selected developing countries. She addresses the problem of the provi-
sions of Trade Property Rights Intellectual Protections in developing 
countries. With weak capacity to protect intellectual property rights at 
home, low-income countries are robbed of their innovations, including 
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cultural and historical property asset rights. Cook explores the question 
of how a developing country may respond to the challenge of greater 
intellectual property protection, and whether foreign patent offices have 
become complements and substitutes for domestic patent offices. 
The book concludes with Chapter 7 by Hadi Esfahani, who asks 
whether we as a society and as individuals are developing the right 
skills and procedures to deal with the challenges of new global oppor-
tunities. To address this question, Esfahani discusses previous trends 
in globalization, which have consisted of greater integration of world 
markets with the help of technological progress and improved gover-
nance across countries. He then turns to future trends in globalization, 
and says that policy reforms are unlikely to make countries uniform in 
terms of governance and regulation, but they will bring about greater 
harmony. Esfahani concludes his chapter by discussing the types of 
skills necessary to compete in a future global economy. 
One of the goals of this lecture series is that reading these thought-
provoking papers will stimulate action. It will stimulate the reader to 
search for additional resources on the issues raised. It will stimulate the 
reader to bring a more well-grounded understanding to debates about 
globalization. It will stimulate readers to confront xenophobic proscrip-
tions to let other countries solve their own problems. Like many aspects 
of progress, globalization has great potential and has its downsides. 
The goal of collecting papers that analyze issues of globalization is to 




Can Globalization Help? 
Ian Goldin 
Oxford University 
Kenneth A. Reinert 
George Mason University 
Globalization broadly refers to the expansion of worldwide link-
ages within and increasing interdependence of human activity in the 
economic, social, cultural, political, technological, and even biological 
spheres. The areas in which globalization operates can interact with one 
another. For instance, while HIV/AIDS is a biological phenomenon, 
it interacts with economic, social, cultural, political, and technological 
forces at global, regional, national, and community levels. The relation-
ship between globalization and development is not well understood, 
and disagreement regarding this relationship abounds. Globalization is, 
to many, the best means of bringing prosperity to the greatest number of 
people all around the world. For others, it represents an important cause 
of global poverty. 
The five economic dimensions of globalization examined here are 
trade, finance, aid, migration, and ideas. Whereas trade is the exchange 
of goods and services among the countries of the world, capital flows 
involve the exchange of assets or financial instruments among these 
countries. Foreign aid involves the transfer of loans and grants among 
countries, as well as technical assistance or capacity building. Migration 
takes place when people move between countries, either temporarily or 
permanently, to seek education and employment or to escape adverse 
political environments. Ideas represent the broadest globalization phe-
nomenon. They involve the generation and international transmission 
of intellectual constructs in areas such as technology, management, or 
governance. 
One can hope that these dimensions of economic globalization 






6 Goldin and Reinert 
indeed often the case. In other instances, however, the link between 
globalization and development breaks down. As we will argue here, 
there are no statements regarding the relationship between globaliza-
tion and development that are both simple and accurate. Rather, state-
ments regarding this relationship are necessarily complex if they are to 
be accurate.1 
A HIsTORICAL VIEW 
Economic historians date the modern era of globalization to approx-
imately 1870. The period from 1870 to 1914 is often considered to be 
the birth of the modern world economy, which, by some measures, was 
as integrated as it is today. Historians have observed that, from the point 
of view of capital flows, the late 1800s were an extraordinary time.2 
The global integration of capital markets was facilitated by advances 
in rail and ship transportation and in telegraph communication. Euro-
pean colonial systems were at their highest stages of development, and 
migration was at a historical high point in relation to the global popula-
tion of the time. 
This first modern stage of globalization was followed by two addi-
tional stages, one from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s and another from 
the mid-1970s to the present. These, however, were preceded by World 
War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. During these events, 
many aspects of globalization were reversed as the world experienced 
increased conflict, nationalism, and patterns of economic autarky. To 
some extent, then, the second and third modern stages of globalization 
merely involved regaining lost levels of international integration. 
The second modern stage of globalization began at the end of World 
War II. It was accompanied by a global, economic regime developed by 
the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 establishing the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), what was to become the World Bank, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This stage of global-
ization involved an increase in capital flows from the United States, 
as well as a U.S.-inspired production system that relied on exploiting 
economies of scale in manufacturing and the advance of U.S.-based 
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This second stage also involved some reduction of trade barriers 
under the auspices of GATT. Developing countries were not highly 
involved in this liberalization, however. In export products of interest 
to developing countries (agriculture, textiles, and clothing), a system of 
nontariff measures in rich countries evolved. Also, a set of key develop-
ing countries, especially those in Latin America, pursued import substi-
tution industrialization with their own trade barriers.3 These develop-
ments, along with the Cold War, suppressed the integration of many 
developing countries into the world trading system. 
The third modern stage of globalization began in the late 1970s. 
This stage followed the demise of monetary relationships developed 
at the Bretton Woods Conference and involved the emergence of the 
newly industrialized countries of East Asia, especially Japan, Taiwan 
(China), and the Republic of Korea. Rapid technological progress, par-
ticularly in transportation, communication, and information technol-
ogy, began to dramatically lower the costs of moving goods, capital, 
people, and ideas across the globe.4 
What has been the historical relationship among these three stages 
of modern globalization and development? A partial view is found in 
Figure 2.1. This figure combines a single measure of globalization— 
exports as a percentage of world gross domestic product (GDP)—with 
a single measure of poverty—the number of extremely dollar poor peo-
ple—in a time series from 1870 to 1998. What is clear from this figure 
is that, historically, globalization and global poverty can be either posi-
tively related or negatively related to each other. From 1870 through 
1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression, globalization (trade) 
and global poverty increased together. However, the retreat from glo-
balization during the Great Depression and World War II was accompa-
nied by a continued increase in global poverty. This can be seen from 
the 1950 data in the figure showing that, when exports as a percentage 
of GDP had declined nearly back to the 1870 level, extreme poverty 
reached a peak of approximately 1.4 billion persons. 
As seen in Figure 2.1, the increase in globalization as measured by 
trade in the second and third stages of modern globalization has been 
associated with a gradual decline in extreme poverty to approximately 
1.1 billion people. During these stages, globalization and poverty have 
been negatively associated with each other, albeit mildly so. Akey public 
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Page 1Ravallion (2004). 
level of extreme poverty. Understanding how to do this requires a deep-
er understanding of the links between globalization and poverty. 
TRADE 
Of all aspects of globalization, international trade is held out as the 
great hope for poverty alleviation.5 Trade can contribute to poverty alle-
viation by expanding markets, promoting competition, and raising pro-
ductivity, each of which has the potential to increase the real incomes 
of poor people. But it would be a mistake to rely on trade liberalization 
alone as a means of reducing poverty.6 A more comprehensive approach 
is needed that addresses multiple economic and social challenges simul-
taneously and that emphasizes the expansion of poor people’s capabili-
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ties, especially in the areas of health and education.7 Nevertheless, trade 
has some vital roles to play. 
Since the mid-1980s, developing countries have increased their 
global trade exports significantly, even in services where their com-
parative advantage is typically seen as weak. For various reasons, 
not the least of which are trade barriers maintained by rich countries, 
developing country agricultural (primary) exports have been stagnant 
(see Figure 2.2). There is also a divergence of export experience across 
developing countries, with Africa’s share of world exports declining 
over time. 
International trade is a means of expanding markets, and market 
expansion can help generate employment and incomes for poor people. 
Comparisons are often made between the wages of workers in poor-
country export industries and the wages of workers in developed coun-
tries. In these comparisons, the wages of workers in developing-country 
export industries often appear to be very low. Consequently, trade has 
often been identified as poverty worsening. However, the more rele-
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10 Goldin and Reinert 
vant comparison is between the wages of export sector workers with 
agricultural day laborers, both in the same developing country. Here it 
can often be seen that the alternative of agricultural day labor is much 
worse. It is precisely this type of income comparison that draws work-
ers into export industries.8 
It must be kept in mind that not all export activity is equal from 
the point of view of raising the incomes of poor people. Exporting can 
best contribute to poverty alleviation when it supports labor-intensive 
production, human capital accumulation (both education and health), 
and technological learning. In addition, the incomes of poor individuals 
depend on buoyant and sustainable export incomes, which in turn are 
dependent on export prices. 
International trade is also a means of promoting competition, and 
in many instances, this can help poor people. Increased competition 
lowers the real costs of both consumption and production. For exam-
ple, domestic monopolies charge monopoly prices that can be signifi-
cantly above competitive prices. The competition introduced by imports 
erodes market power, lowering prices. These procompetitive effects of 
trade can expand household budgets and lower the costs of production. 
The latter can have additional employment effects that are advanta-
geous to poor individuals by lowering nonwage costs in labor-intensive 
production activities. Procompetitive effects can also arise in the case 
of monopsony power. Here, sellers (small farmers, for example) to the 
monopsony buyer are able to obtain higher prices for their goods as the 
buying power of the monopsonist is eroded. 
There is some evidence that international trade can promote pro-
ductivity in a country, and it is possible that productivity increases can 
in turn support the incomes of poor people.9 Exports of all types or in 
all countries cannot generate positive productivity effects, but in cer-
tain instances they can. Export postures can place the exporting firms 
in direct contact with discerning international customers, facilitating 
upgrading processes. There is no consensus within international eco-
nomics on the extent of these upgrading effects, but they are present in 
some cases.10 
There are occasions when international trade can have direct health 
and safety impacts on poor individuals—impacts that can be beneficial 
or detrimental. Perhaps most importantly, improving the health out-
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is simply not possible for most small, developing countries to produce 
the entire range of even basic medical supplies, no less more advanced 
medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. However, many developing 
countries import large amounts of weaponry and export sexual services, 
both of which can have dramatically negative outcomes for the health 
and safety of poor individuals.11 In addition, the production processes 
of some export industries can adversely affect the health of workers in 
those industries, and a small but important amount of trade involves 
hazardous waste dumping. 
CAPITAL FLOWs 
Private capital flows are an important resource for developing coun-
tries. They augment domestic savings and can contribute to investment, 
growth, financial sector development, and technology transfer. How-
ever, there is also substantial evidence that capital flows entail potential 
costs that are both much larger than in the case of trade and dispropor-
tionately carried by the poor. Additionally, it has become clear that not 
all capital flows are the same in their benefit and cost characteristics. 
For these reasons, the cost and benefit characteristics of distinct types of 
capital flows must be considered in some detail.12 Here we distinguish 
among foreign direct investment, equity portfolio investment, bond 
finance, and commercial bank lending. 
The financial markets involved in equity portfolio investment, bond 
finance, and commercial bank lending are characterized by a number 
of market failures. In normal circumstances, these imperfections tend 
to contribute to a certain amount of market volatility, as shown in Fig-
ure 2.3. Under certain circumstances that are not fully understood (but 
are particularly important in emerging economies), they can lead to 
full-blown financial crises. Imperfections in financial markets appear 
to be particularly problematic when commercial banks in developing 
countries are given access to short-term, foreign lending sources.13 The 
resulting problems have three causes. First, systems of financial inter-
mediation in developing countries tend to rely heavily on the banking 
sector, while other types of financial intermediation typically are being 
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Figure 2.3  Nominal Flows of Aid, FDI, Portfolio Investment, and 
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SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Indicators Online. 
to liberalize domestic financial markets, sometimes before systems of 
prudential bank regulation and management are put in place. Third, 
developing countries have sometimes prematurely liberalized their cap-
ital accounts.14 Consequently, care must be taken in managing evolving 
financial systems and their access to international capital flows. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can have positive impacts on pov-
erty by creating employment, improving technology and human capi-
tal, and promoting competition. Not all kinds of FDI contribute in this 
way, however, and some can adversely impact certain dimensions of 
poverty through unsafe working conditions and environmental degra-
dation. Nevertheless, as it pertains to poverty alleviation, FDI is the 
most promising category of capital flows.15 As can be seen in Figure 
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Many developing countries lack access to the technologies avail-
able in developed countries, and hosting MNEs from developed coun-
tries is one way to potentially gain access to that technology. There are 
limits to technology transfer, however. First, MNEs will employ the 
technology that most suits their strategic needs and not the develop-
ment needs of host countries. For example, MNEs can employ pro-
cesses that are much more capital intensive than would be desired on 
the basis of host-country employment considerations.16 Second, there is 
a strong tendency for MNEs to conduct their research and development 
in their home bases rather than in host countries.17 
Despite these general limitations, in some important cases, MNEs 
do transfer technology and establish significant relationships with host-
country suppliers via backward linkages. If foreign MNE begins to 
source inputs locally rather than by importing them, the host country 
can gain a number of important benefits. First, employment can increase 
since the sourced inputs represent new production. Second, production 
technologies can be better adapted to local conditions since suppliers 
are more likely to employ labor-intensive processes. Third, the MNE 
can transfer state-of-the-art business practices and technologies to the 
local suppliers. Fourth, it is possible that the local suppliers can coalesce 
into a spatial cluster that supports innovation and upgrading.18 
Another avenue through which MNEs can positively affect host 
economies is through “spillovers” to other sectors of these econo-
mies. The evidence to date suggests that such spillovers do occur in 
some circumstances and can be significant. However, in the words of 
Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), they are not “guaranteed, automatic, 
or free.” What determines whether positive technology spillovers will 
occur? Many factors are involved, and these include host country poli-
cies, MNE behavior, and industry characteristics. One key factor is the 
capacity of local firms to absorb foreign technologies. Blomström and 
Kokko (2003) suggest that learning is a key capacity that is respon-
sive to various host country policies, and evidence presented in Tsang, 
Nguyen, and Erramilli (2004) in the case of Vietnam supports this view. 
There is some evidence that MNEs in Africa offer higher wages 
than domestic firms (see te Velde and Morrissey [2003]). This effect is 
more predominant for skilled than unskilled workers. FDI can therefore 
have differential impacts that exclude unskilled workers. This can result 
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of these considerations point to the role of basic education and skills 
development in making the most of FDI for poverty alleviation.19 
The low-income countries as a whole are largely excluded from 
global FDI flows. For example, in 2002, low-income countries received 
only 2 percent of total FDI flows, with nearly half of this going to India 
and Vietnam alone. For these countries, exclusion from this dimension 
of globalization is a long-term concern. 
Equity Portfolio Investment 
There is evidence that capital inflows in the form of equity portfolio 
investment might be more beneficial than both bond finance and com-
mercial bank lending. For example, Reisen and Soto (2001) have exam-
ined the impact of all four capital inflows considered here on growth 
for a sample of 44 countries. They find that FDI, considered above, 
did indeed have a positive impact on economic growth. The most 
positive growth impact, however, came from equity portfolio flows. 
Bond finance, considered below, did not have any impact on growth, 
and commercial bank lending, also considered below, had a negative 
impact. These results suggest that equity inflows, along with FDI, could 
play an especially positive role in growth, development, and poverty 
alleviation. 
Why can equity portfolio investment play a positive role in growth 
and development, at least under some circumstances? Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2000) summarize research on this question with four possi-
bilities: 1) equity portfolio inflows are an important source of funds 
for developing countries; 2) the development of equity markets helps 
to provide an exit mechanism for venture capitalists, and this increases 
entrepreneurial activity; 3) portfolio inflows assist developing coun-
tries to move from short-term finance to longer-term finance and help 
to finance investment in projects that have economies of scale; and
4) the development of equity markets provides an informational mecha-
nism evaluating the performance of domestic firms and can help pro-
vide incentives to managers to perform well. 
With regard to volatility, there is some evidence that institutional 
investors managing equity flows are less likely than banks to engage 
in herd and contagion behavior.20 However, in general, equity markets 
are underdeveloped in much of the developing world. For example, 
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nearly the entire net portfolio equity inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa 
are accounted for by one country alone: South Africa. The World Bank 
(2004) summarizes the features of developing-country equity markets 
as follows: 
Market capitalization as a share of GDP in low-income countries 
is about one-sixth of that in high-income countries . . . Stock ex-
changes in developing countries also tend to lag technologically 
behind developed markets. Technology plays a major role in the 
trading, clearance, and settlement processes; problems in those 
areas can discourage sophisticated investors. Institutions that 
supervise and support the operation of the stock exchange also 
tend to be weaker in developing countries. (p. 95) 
The development of equity markets in low- and middle-income 
countries is more complex than it might first appear, however. This is 
due to the increased globalization of financial services. Observers have 
pointed to a set of domestic factors as being particularly important in 
equity market development. These factors include sound macroeco-
nomic policies, minimal degrees of technology, legal systems that pro-
tect shareholders, and open financial markets. However, as pointed out 
by Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002), these are precisely 
the factors that tend to promote the “migration” of equity exchange 
out of developing countries to the major exchanges in financial capital 
of developed countries. This migration process complicates standard 
notions of equity market development. Steil (2001) has argued that the 
way forward is to link local markets with global markets. However, 
there might remain medium-sized firms with local information needs 
that could benefit from some kind of domestic or regional equity mar-
ket. This is an area that requires urgent attention for the development of 
novel approaches. 
Bond Finance and Commercial Bank Lending 
In the minds of the financial world, there are significant differences 
between portfolio equity investment and debt. This shows up in the fact 
that, in the case of bankruptcy, debt is given priority over equity. This 
tends to support the preference for debt over equity in markets, a prefer-
ence that appears to be misplaced from a development and poverty alle-
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and Hufbauer (2001) note that “bank lending may be more prone to run 
than portfolio capital, because banks themselves are highly leveraged, 
and they are relying on the borrower’s balance sheet to ensure repay-
ment” (p. 47). The World Bank (2001) notes that “incentives are key to 
limiting undue risk-taking and fraudulent behavior in the management 
and supervision of financial intermediaries—especially banks that are 
prone to costly failure” (p. 3). 
What can be done to support the safe development of banking 
sectors in low-income countries? Some of the necessary steps can be 
thought of in terms of information, institutions, and incentives. With 
regard to information, it is important for banks to embrace internation-
ally sanctioned accounting and auditing procedures and to make the 
results of these assessments available to the public. In the case of insti-
tutions or the rules of the “banking game,” risk management practices 
(both credit and currency) must be sufficiently stringent, and prudential 
regulation systems must be well developed. With regard to currency 
risk, the World Bank (2004) notes that “particular care should be taken 
to ensure that foreign-currency liabilities are appropriately hedged” (p. 
30).21 These information and institutional safeguards are no small task 
and inevitably cannot be achieved in the short term. Consequently, they 
should be buttressed with incentive measures in the form of market-
friendly taxes on banking capital inflows. For example, Eichengreen 
(1999) argues that “banks borrowing abroad should be required to put 
up additional noninterest-bearing reserves with the central bank” (p. 
117). Such taxes on short-term capital inflows in the form of variable 
deposit requirements appear to be important to prevent destabilizing 
episodes of overborrowing.22 
To summarize, debt flows in the form of bond finance and com-
mercial bank lending appear to have different properties than equity 
flows in the form of FDI and portfolio equity investment. They are more 
prone to the imperfect behaviors that characterize financial markets and 
do not appear to have positive growth effects as large as those associ-
ated with equity flows. Consequently, utilization of debt finance must 
be cautious and sufficiently hedged against exchange rate risks. 
 
   
Can Globalization Help? 17 
AID 
It has been relatively recently that governments began to provide 
financial and technical assistance to foreign countries. The purpose 
of this assistance has varied and has included geopolitical objectives, 
stimulating economic development, ameliorating poverty, promoting 
political outcomes, and ensuring civil stability. Although foreign aid 
is often visualized in terms of financial “handouts” by rich countries to 
the world’s poorest inhabitants, the truth is significantly more complex. 
Indeed, contrary to popular perception, low-income countries gener-
ally receive less than half of total aid flows. Much of the remainder is 
made up by flows to middle-income countries, and some high-income 
countries of strategic interest receive significant amounts of assistance. 
Foreign aid, or official development assistance (ODA), as it is tech-
nically known, is composed of a wide range of financial and nonfi-
nancial instruments used in support of growth and poverty-reduction 
efforts. The transfer of financial resources is an important part of devel-
opment assistance, but finance is only one of the instruments used to 
support development. Nonfinancial forms of assistance include tangi-
ble grants of machinery or equipment and less tangible contributions 
such as the provision of technical analysis, advice, or capacity building, 
including trade-related capacity building. Such forms of assistance are 
vital, especially in environments where finance is not likely to con-
tribute to poverty reduction, such as early in postconflict situations or 
where institutions are particularly weak. 
As is evident in Figure 2.3, since the 1990s, FDI and portfolio flows 
have dwarfed the historically recent flow of aid. For example, develop-
ment aid in 2005 (US$106 billion) totaled only slightly over one-third 
of FDI in developing countries (US$281 billion). In terms of historical 
availability, flows of aid saw an initial rise from 1945 to 1960 but then 
increased only slowly from the 1960s until around 1990. From then 
until 2001, they dropped to only 0.2 percent of the GDP of high-income 
countries. In the last four or so years, this trend has been reversed, with 
ODA reaching a record high in 2005 and many countries committing 
themselves to doubling aid budgets by 2010. But only 5 of the 22 high-
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that pledged 0.7 percent of their GDP to foreign aid actually met this 
goal as of 2005. 
In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals signaled a renewed 
push for increased aid flows and better aid effectiveness, and there has 
been significant recent progress in increasing the impact of aid. Indeed, 
the estimated poverty-reduction productivity of ODA is significantly 
better than it was in the early 1990s (Collier and Dollar 2004).23 When 
all aid is lumped together, some analyses have found no clear relation-
ship between aid and growth or poverty reduction (see, for example, 
Boone [1996]). But not all aid is aimed directly at poverty reduction, 
nor has aid always been provided in ways that will maximize growth. 
Moreover, because aid is often provided to help countries cope with 
external shocks, even if aid is reasonably well designed and allocated, 
the positive impact of such aid may be obscured by the magnitude of 
the shocks. Disaster relief, for example, is not aimed directly at long-
term poverty reduction, and thus it is no surprise that such aid is not 
correlated with that result.24 However, it does achieve its goal of helping 
to avert famine or assisting countries to recover from natural disasters. 
Donors initially placed too much emphasis on the role of what were 
often isolated projects, neglecting the quality of the overall country 
environment for growth, a mistake that adjustment or (policy-based) 
aid was intended to overcome. Additionally, as mentioned above, aid 
was sometimes allocated for purely strategic reasons, with growth and 
poverty reduction in these cases being distinct secondary concerns, if 
they were concerns at all. Given this diversity of motives, it is not sur-
prising that aid did not always have the hoped-for effects on growth and 
poverty reduction. 
The adjustment programs that came into their own in partial 
response to the macroeconomic imbalances of the 1970s had their own 
problems. Donors incorrectly believed that conditionality on loans and 
grants could substitute for country ownership. Too often, governments 
receiving aid were not truly committed to reforms. Moreover, neither 
donors nor governments focused sufficiently on poverty in designing 
the adjustment programs. In many countries, donors underestimated 
the importance of governance, institutional reforms, and social invest-
ments. Prescriptions for reform were too formulaic, ignoring the central 
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tions reduced the amount of productivity growth and poverty reduction 
that could result from the macroeconomic reforms. 
During the 1990s, a rethinking of development models and the role 
of aid began. This was facilitated by a combination of four develop-
ments. First, the end of the Cold War reduced the geopolitical pres-
sures on aid agencies. Second, there was an increasing recognition of 
the successes of India, China, and other developing countries that had 
achieved macro balance and sustained growth while adopting their own 
particular development models. Third, there was mounting evidence of 
an apparent failure of orthodox adjustment models adopted by African 
and other highly indebted countries, as evidenced by the lack of posi-
tive growth and poverty outcomes. Finally, there was a growing body of 
analytic literature that highlighted the importance of the need for a more 
comprehensive approach to development and wider understanding of 
poverty, focusing on both human capital (education, health) and physi-
cal capital (infrastructure), as well as institutions and participation.25 
The statistical evidence shows that large-scale financial aid can gen-
erally be used effectively for poverty reduction when reasonably good 
policies are in place.26 In recent years, donors have increasingly acted 
on these findings by tailoring support to local needs and circumstances. 
Thus, the balance of support has moved toward providing large-scale 
aid to those that can use it well and focusing on knowledge and capacity-
building support in other countries. This has been reflected in greater 
selectivity and coordination in lending, shifting resources toward gov-
ernance and institutions, emphasizing ownership, and making room 
for diverse responses to local needs. These new approaches and proce-
dures have begun to pay off. However, it is clear that there is still much 
to learn: for example, how can countries with very weak governance 
effectively catalyze and support reforms and institution building? 
Should we then use only policy and institutional quality as mea-
sures in determining aid flows? This would probably be too rash a con-
clusion. Research by Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) takes an 
entirely different approach: instead of focusing on the different policy 
and institutional characteristics of recipient countries, they focus on the 
characteristics of different types of aid flows. Importantly, they only 
consider what they term “short-impact” aid, which includes budget and 
balance of payments support, infrastructure investments, and aid for 
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productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. In contrast to pre-
vious studies, they find a strong impact of aid on growth (and thus on 
poverty reduction, at least to some extent) regardless of institutions and 
policies.27 In light of such evidence, it probably is too soon to call for 
substantial reallocations of aid other than of those flows that reflect only 
strategic, rather than humanitarian or economic, considerations. 
MIGRATION 
International migration involves the movement of people, on either 
a temporary or permanent basis, among the countries of the world 
economy. Throughout human history, these changes of residence have 
helped to alleviate human suffering, enhance technological progress, 
and promote cultural exchange. As of 2006, approximately 200 million 
people, or 3 percent of the world’s population, lived outside their coun-
try of birth. Although this percentage is low by historical standards, 
international migration has doubled since 1980. Migration continues to 
be a key dimension of globalization and development, albeit one that 
has complex determinants and outcomes. 
A central component of the modern era of globalization that began 
in the late nineteenth century was the Age of Mass Migration, described 
by Hatton and Williamson (1998). Between 1850 and 1914, approxi-
mately 55 million Europeans migrated, most of them unskilled males 
who settled in the United States. As Manning (2005) emphasizes, how-
ever, the Age of Mass Migration was not just European in nature, with 
50 million Chinese and 30 million Indians also migrating (not all vol-
untarily), primarily to serve as unskilled laborers in British colonies in 
Africa and the Pacific. Since then, much has changed, with migration 
becoming an increasingly elusive escape route from poverty. 
High-skilled migrants from developing countries are commonly 
trained at substantial costs to the taxpayers of source countries through 
public education systems. Their departure thus has profound effects in 
the form of what is known as brain drain. Source countries can also 
lose tax revenues that migrants would have generated. More impor-
tantly, many of the skills sent from less-developed to more-developed 
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cal services, for which more-developed countries have a strong desire 
and less-developed countries an urgent need, the brain drain can cost 
lives. In Malawi, for example, HIV/AIDS has reduced the country’s life 
expectancy to under 40 years. Despite this health crisis, the country has 
lost approximately half its nursing staff to migration. Partly as a result, 
the rate at which Malawian women die during pregnancy and childbirth 
has approximately doubled.28 
The emigration of skilled workers does not always create problems 
for source countries. In some cases, emigration alerts outside investors to 
a large or relatively underused skill base of the source country. The suc-
cess of skilled Indian migrants in the United States, for instance, helped 
to spur the large inflow of information and communication technology-
related FDI to India seen during recent years. Many foreign informa-
tion and communication technology companies, impressed by the talent 
working for them outside India, sought equivalently skilled individu-
als within India as employees in FDI-related facilities. Thus, when the 
conditions are right, skilled migrants are able to generate networks of 
investment, trade, and technology transfer that increase the productivity 
and demand for skills in the home country, while extending the global 
technology frontier and lowering the cost of products used by billions 
of people worldwide. 
Another potentially compensating benefit of the brain drain is that it 
tends to increase the demand for skills in the source country by raising 
the rate of return to education. Some researchers have suggested that, 
even accounting for the emigration of skilled individuals, the increase 
in demand for education generated by brain drain may actually increase 
the number of skilled workers in the population. This is known as brain 
gain. While brain gain outcomes are possible, they depend on very large 
responses in the supply of education and training. They are not, there-
fore, a general outcome of high-skilled migration. 
The most easily quantifi able benefit of emigration to source coun-
tries is the flow of money, or remittances, sent by migrant workers to 
their home countries. Recent estimates suggest that the total remittance 
flow to developing countries now exceeds US$200 billion (see Figure 
2.3, which does not quite capture the current value due to data lags in 
the other series). In a number of countries, remittance inflows are larger 
than inflows of foreign direct investment and can compose up to 10 
percent of national incomes. As is evident in Figure 2.4, such fl ows can 
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make a significant difference for families living in poverty in source 
countries, which is a common reason why communities allow and 
sometimes even encourage their family members to seek work abroad 
(see Adams and Page [2005]). 
Under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
liberalization of services trade has occurred in a number of sectors of 
interest to developed countries such as finance and telecommunica-
tions. The WTO’s General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) rec-
ognizes the temporary movement of natural persons as a way to export 
certain labor-intensive services such as housekeeping and construction. 
Given the natural comparative advantage of developing countries in 
such labor-intensive services, this channel could be of great importance 
to their trade and development prospects. The WTO protocol on the 
temporary movement of natural persons, however, is largely limited to 
the exchange of corporate personnel and is not designed to enhance the 
delivery of labor-intensive services. This urgently needs to be rectified. 
IDEAs 
Idea formation and reformation have been and continue to be inte-
gral to development processes and policies because, as emphasized by 
Adelman (2001), development processes are significantly nonlinear and 
nonunique. Consequently, ideas play a key role in organizing and mak-
ing sense of development experience and have gone through a number 
of paradigm shifts. Importantly, the environments to which develop-
ment ideas respond are increasingly affected by the various processes 
characterizing globalization. For this reason, the role of ideas in devel-
opment processes cannot be clearly understood without reference to the 
various other dimensions of increased global integration. 
Ideas are both a powerful influence on development and a key 
dimension of globalization. Relevant here are three areas of inquiry 
related to ideas, development, and globalization: 1) the idea of devel-
opment itself, along with the related issue of the idea of growth; 2) the 
role of ideas in globalization processes; and 3) the question of ideas for 
development, along with the related issues of development knowledge 
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last of these, ideas for development, since it has the most relevance to 
this chapter. 
Ideas are codified in the form of knowledge, and knowledge is 
in many respects a public good. Once an idea has been codified, that 
knowledge can often be used at low marginal cost, and its use by any 
one person does not preclude its use by others. This characteristic of 
knowledge is precisely the hallmark of a public good and suggests that 
knowledge, like other public goods, will be underprovided by market 
systems. The challenge, then, is the effective development and man-
agement of knowledge, recognizing its (global) public good nature. 
Knowledge management, a difficult task for firms, is even more daunt-
ing for developing countries. 
A first element of knowledge management for development is 
increasing the voice of developing countries and their impoverished 
citizens.29 This is an essential ingredient of inclusive globalization and 
is especially important in global consultation and decision making 
with direct consequences for the citizens of developing countries. It 
is also important to enhance developing-country participation in glob-
al institutions in order to ensure their legitimacy. The governance of 
the United Nations (at least at the Security Council level), the World 
Bank, and the IMF reflects the balance of power 60 years ago.30 There 
is widespread recognition of the need for enhancing the participation of 
developing countries. Although some progress has been made in areas 
related to program formation, the structural issues of voting rights and 
board representation remain intractable. It remains, however, as stated 
by Bhattacharya and Griffith-Jones (2004), “important to go beyond 
consultation to full representation of developing countries in bodies that 
deliberate and set international norms and action plans” (p. 205). The 
principles of transparency, accountability, and good governance that 
the global institutions advocate for developing countries should also 
be embraced by these institutions themselves. The requisite reforms are 
indeed daunting, but failure to undertake the challenge will undermine 
any chances of an effective, multilateral system for managing global-
ization and development. 
A second element of knowledge management for development is 
broad access. In addition to investing in education and research, govern-
ments can facilitate the sharing of knowledge and make special efforts 
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lar challenge is to make knowledge available in ways and languages 
that can be understood by wide audiences, such as local development 
practitioners who do not speak English. Timely and effective informa-
tion flows on issues important to poor communities can both mitigate 
risks and expand opportunities. Such efforts include providing market 
prices to poor farmers via village mobile phones, broadcasting weather 
information and disaster warnings on local radios, and highlighting the 
risks of HIV/AIDS and the benefits of public health measures in com-
munity information campaigns. In these sorts of cases, knowledge helps 
to empower poor people. 
A third element of knowledge management for development is 
increased technology transfer to developing countries. Article 66.2 of 
the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) of the WTO commits developed countries to providing “incen-
tives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer” to the least-developed 
countries. This commitment needs to be implemented in practice and 
applied to a wider set of countries. As outlined by Hoekman, Maskus, 
and Saggi (2005), this can occur through a variety of measures, including 
• incentives for corporations and nongovernmental organizations 
to transfer mature patent rights or to provide technical assistance, 
• public support for research into the specific technology needs of 
developing countries, 
• university training for students from the low-income countries in 
science and technology, 
• finance for participation of developing country representatives in 
standard-setting bodies, and 
• public purchase of patents on certain technologies for free use in 
developing countries. 
These and other steps can better ensure that knowledge in the form of 
international technological development is more broadly spread in the 
developing world. 
Ideas codified into knowledge can become property when legal sys-
tems confer and enforce intellectual property rights (IPRs). The role of 
IPRs in economic growth and development is controversial to say the 
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property rights spurs innovation, which in turn leads to higher rates of 
economic growth and poverty reduction. The basis of this argument is 
that, if strong property rights provide good incentives for the produc-
tion of things, they must also provide appropriate incentives for the 
production of ideas. Boldrin and Levine (2002; 2004a,b) question this 
assertion, arguing that intellectual property has come to mean not only 
the right to own and sell ideas, but also the right to regulate their use, 
which can create a socially inefficient monopoly. They agree that, for 
efficiency reasons, ideas should be protected and available for sale, just 
like any other commodity. They object, however, to the idea of an intel-
lectual monopoly, arguing that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a 
necessary consequence of, innovation, and that intellectual property is 
not necessary for innovation and growth. In fact, it can hurt more than 
help. Boldrin and Levine suggest that, although the producers of a new 
product or service should have the right to benefit from its sale, they 
should not be able to appropriate the right of others to learn from the 
ideas embodied in that product. This argument has important implica-
tions for the role of ideas in globalization and development. 
Since IPRs involve a key trade-off between potentially enhancing 
innovation and supporting the monopolization of ideas, their applica-
tion requires careful analysis of both benefits and costs of conferral in 
order to ensure that IPR regimes promote both growth and more equi-
table development. How this can best be done is a question to which 
answers greatly diverge. We consider here the issues of patents and tra-
ditional knowledge. 
Patents are a central concern with regard to the role of IPRs in 
development, especially in the areas of health, food, and agriculture. As 
summarized by Leach (2004), for instance, “The essential trade-off in 
choosing the patent life is that a longer patent life raises the rate at which 
discoveries occur, but reduces the social benefits of each discovery” 
(p. 175). The proponents of stronger patent protection in developing 
countries argue that this protection will promote domestic innovation 
as well as the flow of ideas through increased FDI and exports. There 
is not complete agreement on this matter, however. For example, Kash 
and Kingston (2001) argue that, in the case of complex technologies, 
patent protection can actually inhibit innovation. To some extent, then, 
the ability of increased patent protection to deliver access to knowledge 
and innovation is uncertain. 
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One suggested reform of current intellectual property arrangements 
is to modify rules governing patents under the TRIPS agreement to 
allow for patent ladders, in which the minimum extent of patent protec-
tion varies according to level of per capita income. Although designing 
such a system is not straightforward, this is a way to avoid what, in 
the case of environmental or labor standards, is disparagingly called a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach to the standardization of global governance 
systems. 
One key area regarding patent protection is in the field of pharma-
ceuticals and the extension of patent rights to developing countries as 
required by TRIPS. Although some argue that the extension of intel-
lectual property rights may lead to more research on drugs to address 
developing country needs, the evidence on the short experience since 
this extension remains hotly contested (see, for example, Lanjouw and 
Cockburn [2001]). There is evidence that the relatively low levels of 
purchasing power in developing countries and the apparent lack of 
commercial interest by the pharmaceutical companies remain impor-
tant barriers. 
Recent years have seen a number of highly significant efforts to 
boost investment in research and its application in developing coun-
tries. These include the Measles Initiative, the Global Alliance for Vac-
cines and Immunizations, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, and the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Despite these 
notable efforts, the recent example of the pressure placed on the gov-
ernments of Brazil, India, and South Africa to honor U.S. patents on 
HIV/AIDS drugs, thus raising the costs of these drugs to AIDS patients 
in these countries, signals a remaining issue with regard to TRIPS and 
public health. 
There appear to be two approaches to dealing with the ongoing issue 
of intellectual property and public health, namely the Lanjouw (2006) 
proposal on regional declarations in patent applications and compul-
sory licensing under a permanent amendment to TRIPS. Lanjouw pro-
poses that developed-country patent systems allow for patent enforce-
ment only in one of two regions of the world: developed countries or 
developing countries. In the case of what Lanjouw terms “global” dis-
eases such as cancer or heart disease, developed-country pharmaceuti-
cal companies would choose to ensure patent protection in developed 
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delivery of generic pharmaceuticals to the developing world. In the 
case of “tropical” diseases such as malaria, pharmaceutical companies 
would choose to ensure patent protection in the developing countries, 
hopefully spurring innovation. Thus, the trade-off between innovation 
and low cost would hopefully break out in the desired fashion across 
global and tropical diseases. 
This is an important proposal that has consequently received a good 
deal of attention. It may not, however, adequately cover some important 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS that have both global and tropical char-
acteristics. There could indeed be cases where compulsory licensing 
proves to be required in order to adequately address public health cri-
ses. A 2001 Doha ministerial declaration on TRIPS and public health 
reconfirmed certain “flexibilities” available to protect public health, 
including compulsory licensing. This declaration did not, however, 
address the issue of the right of countries without domestic capacity 
to import nonpatent pharmaceuticals.31 A 2003 WTO decision on this 
issue allowed poor countries to import off-patent, generic drugs under 
specified conditions, and directed the WTO TRIPS Council to prepare 
an amendment based “where appropriate” on the decision (Matthews 
2004, 2006). An agreement regarding this amendment was reached in 
2005 and ratified in 2007. It remains, however, both for supporting leg-
islation in WTO member countries to be fully enacted and for the provi-
sions of the amendment to be tested in practice.32 It has become clear 
that capacity building is necessary to support use of the system. 
From the point of view of poverty alleviation, it is essential that 
intellectual property protection be extended to traditional knowledge, 
folklore, and culture, or what Finger (2004) calls “poor people’s knowl-
edge.” It is not only essential that intellectual property regimes allow 
developing countries to benefit from ideas developed in rich countries, 
but also that their own indigenous ideas are suitably protected. The key 
issue here, as expressed by Finger, is that of “enhancing the commercial 
value of poor people’s knowledge in which there are no worries about 
this use being culturally offensive to members of the community or 
about this use undermining the traditional culture of the community” 
(p. 3). Unless it extends to such types of knowledge, intellectual prop-
erty protection will fail to positively help poor communities. Individual 
country governments can help in this process by following India’s lead 
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formal inventories of all cultural property that its citizens might exploit 
in the future (Sahai 2003). This is important to prevent future theft of 
the country’s cultural patrimony. 
CONCLusION 
History and the recent experiences of many countries show that glo-
balization can be a tool for reducing poverty. People living in poverty 
are less likely to remain so in a country that is exchanging its goods, 
services, and ideas with the rest of the world. Yet this positive impact 
and reach remains uneven and there is a need for global coordination 
and more effective global governance on issues such as armaments and 
climate change. Several key areas for action are outlined below.33 
First, global trade negotiations must produce more balanced out-
comes if developing countries are to be able to successfully lift their 
people out of poverty. Their ability to trade a wide range of goods and 
services must be facilitated, and rich countries must stop impeding 
development by the imposition of damaging tariff barriers and agri-
cultural subsidies. For instance, there are twice as many tariff barriers 
imposed upon goods produced by poor people as those produced by rich 
countries. Nearly US$300 billion a year is spent on agricultural subsi-
dies, which are almost worth more than the entire GDP of sub-Saharan 
Africa.34 These subsidies deny developing countries export markets and 
damage their capability to sell their produce in their own country. These 
practices compound downward trends in commodity pricing, increase 
instability, and undermine potential for diversification into higher value-
added manufactured products. Therefore, reforming the world trade 
system is a vital step in ensuring that all the world’s inhabitants are able 
to reap the benefits of globalization. 
The second area for action is the increased provision of aid, assis-
tance, and debt relief to countries that demonstrate a commitment to the 
effective and equitable use of the additional resources. As mentioned 
above, aid volumes have declined during recent decades to approxi-
mately 0.25 percent of high-income countries’ GDP, despite the fact 
that donor countries are richer now than ever before and that aid has 
never been more effectively used. Providing increased foreign assis-
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tance and implementing more rigorous schemes to monitor and evalu-
ate the effective use of that aid are thus critical to ensuring that the 
gains provided by globalization are not reversed by bad governance and 
ineffective use of aid. 
Foreign aid resource transfers are particularly important in the 
poorest countries, and much higher levels of aid are urgently required 
for investments in health, education, infrastructure, and for combating 
HIV/AIDS and other diseases. These investments cannot be financed 
by domestic savings alone, especially in countries that are currently 
crushed under burdens of debt and escaping the ravages of past corrup-
tion and mismanagement. 
A third area for action is enhancing the benefits of migration and 
mitigating the negative effects. Remittances of over US$200 billion 
have flowed directly to a large number of individuals and communities 
(in contrast to much of aid). The transaction costs of such flows should 
be lowered from the current 10–15 percent to around 1 percent, which 
is closer to the cost of transfers between rich countries. On the other 
hand, the loss of highly skilled individuals in the “brain drain” needs to 
be mitigated, as it is a severe problem for many African and Caribbean 
developing countries. Addressing the problems of the current migration 
system and increasing its ability to provide real gains to poor people 
will require a multilateral as well as bilateral commitment to effective 
migration reform and management. 
Finally, the international community should support global public 
goods. Three examples are in the areas of eradicating the major infec-
tious diseases, enhancing agricultural research, and combating climate 
change. Most important, however, is the need for global peace and 
stability to prevent war and civil conflict, which do much to generate 
underdevelopment in many parts of the world. 
Globalization has the potential to be a vehicle for shared growth, 
prosperity, and reductions in poverty. However, this potential is not yet 
being adequately realized, and the positive impacts of globalization 
remain uneven. Global trade equity, more and better aid, effectively 
benefiting from migration, and the support of global public goods are 
key areas for action on the route to successfully achieving development 
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Notes 
1. For further, more detailed discussion, we refer the reader to Goldin and Reinert 
(2007). 
2. See, for example, James (1996, Chapter 1), O’Rourke and Williamson (1999), and 
World Bank (2002). 
3. See Bruton (1998) for a review of import substitution industrialization. 
4. See Levinson (2006) on the role of container shipping in this process. 
5. See Dollar and Kraay (2004), for example. An alternative view is given in 
Rodríquez and Rodrik (2001). A thorough review of trade and poverty is provided 
by Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004). 
6. The fact that the trade-poverty alleviation linkage is not automatic has been 
stressed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2004) in 
the case of the least developed countries. 
7. Watkins and Fowler (2002) note that “In itself, trade is not inherently opposed to 
the interests of poor people. International trade can be a force for good, or for bad 
. . . The outcomes are not pre-determined. They are shaped by the way in which 
international trade relations are managed, and by national policies” (p. 28). 
8. On the case of Bangladesh, for example, see Zohir (2001) and Watkins and Fowler 
(2002). 
9. For a review of the evidence on trade liberalization and productivity, see Winters, 
McCulloch, and McKay (2004). 
10. On the latter, see de Ferranti et al. (2002). 
11. This point is emphasized by Reinert (2004). 
12. Failure to do this weakens the claims of Rodrik and Subramanian (2008), for 
example. 
13. The World Bank (2001) notes that “If finance is fragile, banking is the most fragile 
part” (p. 11). 
14. For a critique of premature capital account liberalization, see Stiglitz (2000). As 
the World Bank (2001) notes, “Poor sequencing of financial liberalization in a 
poor country environment has undoubtedly contributed to bank insolvency” (p. 
89). Hanson, Honohan, and Majnoni (2003) also note that “the riskiness of capital 
account liberalization without fiscal adjustment . . . and without reasonably strong 
financial regulation and supervision and a sound domestic financial system, is well 
recognized” (p. 10). 
15. The present chapter is in broad agreement with Singh (1999), who says that “The 
experience of many Asian and Latin American countries with portfolio capital 
flows . . . indicates that the African countries would benefit from using their efforts 
and institutional resources to attract FDI rather than portfolio flows” (p. 356). It 
does, however, distinguish between portfolio flows in the form of equity invest-
ment and those in the form of bond finance, with a preference for the former. 
16. Caves (1996) notes that “Survey evidence indicates that MNEs do some adapting 
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that the costs of adaptation commonly are high relative to the benefits expected by 
individual companies” (p. 241). 
17. Dunning (1993) notes that “With the exception of some European-based com-
panies, the proportion of R&D activity by MNEs undertaken outside their home 
countries is generally quite small and, in the case of Japanese firms, negligible” (p. 
301). 
18. For the role of clusters in natural resource–based development, see Ramos (1998). 
19. Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find that it is the combination of FDI 
and education that has a statistically significant impact on growth. 
20. Dobson and Hufbauer (2001, Chapter 1) review this evidence. Singh (1999), to 
some extent at least, contests this conclusion. 
21. Mistakes made in these areas have proved to be too costly to the poor in the past 
for countries to relax their vigilance. Prasad et al. (2003) conclude that “The rela-
tive importance of different sources of financing for domestic investment, as prox-
ied by the following three variables, has been shown to be positively associated 
with the incidence and the severity of currency and financial crises: the ratio of 
bank borrowing or other debt relative to foreign direct investment; the shortness 
of the term structure of external debt; and the share of external debt denominated 
in foreign currencies” (p. 49). 
22. As emphasized by Bhinda et al. (1999), variable deposit requirements are flexible 
in three dimensions: 1) percentage, 2) minimum deposit period, and 3) application 
to new versus existing credits. These flexibilities, as well as their market-friendly 
nature, make variable deposit requirements an attractive policy option. 
23. See, in particular, Goldin, Rogers, and Stern (2002). The overall debate on aid 
effectiveness is reviewed in Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavani (2004). 
24. See Owens and Hoddinott (1998). As Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavani (2004) note, 
“This kind of assistance should have a negative simple correlation with growth, 
as the disaster simultaneously causes both low growth and large aid flows. While 
it is possible that aid might mitigate that fall in growth, any additional pathway of 
causation from humanitarian aid to growth is extremely difficult to detect” (p. 2).
25. In the realm of foreign aid, some (but not all) of this new thinking was reflected in 
World Bank (1998).
26. See Burnside and Dollar (2000). These results have been recently questioned by 
Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004). 
27. The authors note that “The result is robust over a wide variety of specifications . . .
It holds over various time periods, stands up whether we include or exclude influ-
ential observations, and remains robust when controlling for possible endogeneity 
of several independent variables” (p. 40).
 28. Approaches to deal with the difficult issue of brain drain of health professionals 
are discussed in Martineau, Decker, and Bundred (2004).
 29. This theme has been recently taken up by Sen (2006, Chapter 7), who states that 
“The preeminent practical challenges today include the possibility of making use 
of the remarkable benefits of economic connections, technological progress, and 
political opportunity in a way that pays adequate attention to the interests of the 
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30. As Derviş (2005) notes, “Without greater legitimacy at the supranational level, 
progress in solving global problems will be very difficult” (p. 3). Derviş makes 
very specific proposals for changing the governance structures of these institutions 
that deserve careful consideration. 
31. This issue arises because Article 31(f) of TRIPS limits the use of pharmaceuti-
cals produced under compulsory licenses to the domestic markets of producing 
countries. 
32. Matthews (2006) notes that “It is perhaps surprising that no developing country 
has yet used the new mechanism to allow the importation of generic medicines 
following the issuance of a compulsory license in a developed country prior to 
patent expiry” (p. 130). 
33. Further, detailed policy proposals are made in Goldin and Reinert (2007). 
34. To simplify, these are roughly half in the form of producer support payments and 
half in the form of market price support, the latter effected through border mea-
sures. See Tokarick (2008). 
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Western Michigan University 
Ask almost anyone today whether we live in a more globalized 
economy and you will likely hear, “Of course we do, the world is 
‘smaller’ today than a century ago.” While I agree that countries inter-
act much more than in the past, many do not appreciate the history of 
that process, tending to characterize the increased globalization through 
trade, finance, and migration as novel. I begin this chapter by discussing 
economic history for a number of countries, over different time periods, 
and concerning different facets of globalization. 
My goal is to convey three basic points concerning the world econ-
omy. The first is that globalization—sometimes referred to as economic 
integration—is not so new. If we look more carefully at the evidence 
surrounding us we find that the intermingling of people located in dif-
ferent corners of the globe along with their economic interactions is not 
unique to the present period. People and goods have crisscrossed the 
globe for centuries, leaving behind changes in commerce, technology, 
culture, and know-how. 
The second point is that while the globalization process has been 
taking place for some time, it does in several respects manifest itself 
differently today. Facets of globalization and economic integration that 
we observe today do differ in important ways from what we observed 
in the past. These differences are due in part to dramatic technological 
advances that have taken place with respect to transportation and com-
munication. These advances have drastically reduced prices and have 
expanded in many dimensions the modes that can be availed of to trans-






The third point is with respect to globalization’s impact on eco-
nomic development. While it is often claimed that globalization disad-
vantages the less fortunate, causing labor dislocations and increasing 
income disparities around the globe, it is also the case that globalization 
through migration can be a powerful force with the potential to signifi-
cantly improve the lot for out-migration communities in many areas of 
the globe (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). It is this facet of globaliza-
tion—the spread of international migration—upon which this chapter 
ultimately focuses. 
GLOBALIzATION Is NOT sO NEW 
Countries interact with each other in a number of ways—through 
trade in goods and services, by borrowing and lending financial assets, 
and by migration. While this chapter focuses on international migration 
as it relates to globalization and economic development, it begins with 
a detour into more familiar and established territory for most readers. I 
first present data on globalization as measured by the share of interna-
tional trade in GDP—an openness index. This particular index or one 
of its close variants is what researchers usually cite when making the 
case that the world is much more integrated today, that economies today 
interact substantially more with each other relative to the past. 
The notion that globalization is of recent vintage probably origi-
nates from the analysis of an openness index relative to its value 50 or 
60 years ago. For example, take the case of the United States. Figure 3.1 
shows the ratio of U.S. international trade flows (U.S. exports plus U.S. 
imports) to U.S. national income (GDP) since 1945. The graph clearly 
suggests that international trade (as a share of GDP) was relatively level 
to 1970 and then consistently grew. Diagrams such as the one plotted in 
Figure 3.1 are the basis of the general perception that the U.S. economy 
was fairly closed economically with respect to the rest of the world until 
fairly recently. 
By contrast, an examination of Figure 3.2, where this same series is 
plotted from 1870 to the present, provides us with an entirely different 
impression. What emerges from this broader timeline of U.S. economic 
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neither unique nor new. In 1916 merchandise trade as a share of GDP
was 19.7 percent, exceeding the 18.9 percent share observed in 2001. 
The plot suggests that the argument that globalization is new is gener-
ally derived from an examination of data since World War II. But if 
we instead peer further back, a totally different picture emerges. We 
observe relatively low trade flows during and surrounding the interwar 
period (World War I through World War II). The interwar period and 
period immediately surrounding it with its relatively low share of trade 
in GDP appear as an exception to the rule. Both before and after that 
period, international trade played larger roles in the U.S. economy. 
It is understandable that researchers tend to analyze economic flows 
since World War II, generally disregarding or shying away from eco-
nomic data series prior to the interwar period. Since World War II, gov-
ernments and international organizations have become more interested 
in collecting economic data in a systematic and consistent manner.1 
International organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, 
the OECD, and the International Monetary Fund have expended con-
siderable effort and resources to facilitate and coordinate the collection 
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rable across countries and over time.2 Consequently, series since World 
War II have become more reliable, tempting researchers to restrict their 
research to the analysis of recent data, or at a minimum, the post–World 
War II period. There are drawbacks, however, to limiting our analysis 
to more recent data. We fail to appreciate important changes and turning 
points in the time series of flows, compromising our understanding of 
economic activity both in the short and long run. 
Yet another picture emerges of globalization through trade if we 
examine a century of data for Argentina. Figure 3.3 displays an index 
of openness obtained by expressing the sum of Argentina’s exports and 
imports as a share of GDP. While total merchandise trade was equal 
to about half of Argentina’s GDP at the turn of the last century (i.e., in 
1900), Argentina’s trade accounted for less than one-fifth of GDP in 
2000. Using simple indexes of openness, Argentina appears less global-
ized today relative to yesterday. In the Southern Cone, globalization 
through international trade has faltered rather than grown. 
Misconceptions regarding the globalization of economies through 
migration also arise if we similarly limit ourselves to analyzing recent 
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data on migration. U.S. data on the percentage of the U.S. population 
that is foreign born is presented in Figure 3.4. These data are from the 
U.S. decennial census. If we restrict the analysis to data from the 1970s 
to the present we observe that the U.S. population has become increas-
ingly foreign born, from about 5 percent to 12 percent of the U.S. popu-
lation. However, a longer-run view reveals that during the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, an even greater percentage of the U.S. population was 
foreign born, hovering at 15 percent. 
Economic history provides us with many examples of globaliza-
tion from earlier time periods that parallel the process we see occurring 
today. For example, Molina (2008) suggests that legal changes with 
respect to China, both in 1882 and in 2001, in turn impacted Mexican-
U.S. migratory flows in substantial ways. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882, which effectively shut down Chinese immigration to the United 
States, was followed by a substantial rise in Mexican immigrants to the 
United States, presumably due to labor shortages caused by the exclu-






















0 3 6 9 12 15 
Raw sum % foreign 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Carter et al. (2006, Series Ad354, Aa2). 
of China into the World Trade Organization seems to have had a simi-
lar impact, that of stimulating Mexican-U.S. immigration. With China 
a formal member of the world trading system, the relative competi-
tiveness of Mexican industry seems to have been reduced, causing an 
excess supply of Mexican labor. The excess supply seems to have found 
an outlet in the U.S. labor market, which proved relatively eager to 
absorb that Mexican labor. Hence both in 1882 and in 2001, changes in 
immigration statutes with respect to Chinese nationals have impacted 
Mexico-U.S. economic flows. The interactions across countries that we 
observe today and are attributed to “globalization” are similarly found 
in yesterday’s world.  
Another example of economic integration both in the past and today 
is with respect to workers’ remittances. As of late, the popular press has 
consistently reported on the large flows of immigrants’ earnings that are 
sent to their home communities (DeParle 2007, 2008). The main point 
in these articles is that these flows of money have not been adequately 
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have only recently been of much significance. But the notion that remit-
tances were not important or significant in earlier time periods is not 
corroborated by the historical data I have collected on Italian remit-
tances. Figure 3.5 shows the ratio of remittances sent by Italian emi-
grants relative to Italian GNP in order to measure the relative size of 
the flows over time.3 The figure shows averages of this ratio for each 
decade from the 1860s through the 1930s. Around the turn of the cen-
tury, cross-border money flows from Italian-origin immigrants to their 
families remaining in Italy accounted for about 4 or 5 percent of Italian 
national income. The remarkable aspect of this value is that remittances 
to Mexico are currently considered to be at their highest, but not even 
reaching 3 percent of Mexico’s national income.4 Hence, in relation 
to national income, remittances were more important to Italy in 1900 
than they are to Mexico today, even though the levels of remittances to 
Mexico now are considered to be extraordinarily large and newsworthy. 
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GLOBALIzATION MANIFEsTs ITsELF DIFFERENTLy
TODAy RELATIVE TO yEsTERDAy 
There is considerable evidence that the interchange of goods, the 
migrations of people, and the international flows of financial assets 
have a long economic history. The case can be made, however, that 
today’s interactions differ in important respects from the interactions of 
economies yesterday. Technological advances have changed the nature 
of international trade and the context in which immigration, emigra-
tion, and international money flows take place. This section discusses 
how two economic sectors—transportation and communication—have 
affected the globalization process. 
While commentaries today tend to suggest that the observed 
increased trade globalization is a result of changes in the willingness of 
countries to open up to foreign markets (such as through the formation 
of global, regional, and bilateral trade liberalization pacts), economic 
historians are placing more weight on technological change as the main 
driving force. It has become substantially cheaper to transport goods, 
people, and ideas today than it was a century ago, and these reduc-
tions in costs are generally attributed to technological advances. Figure 
3.6 displays Mohammed and Williamson’s (2004) calculations of a real 
global tramp shipping price index, showing that shipping rates in 1994 
were about one-third of 1870 rates in real terms. These reduced trans-
portation costs have certainly played a role in allowing trading patterns 
to become more complex, to involve more nations, and to change direc-
tion at a moment’s notice. 
While declining transportation costs have played an important role 
in stimulating trade, they also are responsible for inducing increased 
flows of people, ideas, and financial assets. Lower transportation costs, 
of course, make migration more likely due to the easing of financial bur-
dens associated with moving from one country to another, but there are 
other channels by which declining transportation costs promote migra-
tion. Lower transportation costs ease the pain and risks that accompany 
migration, inducing more migration to take place. If the migrant dis-
covers that work is not as plentiful or lucrative in the destination area,
lower fares will permit the return of the migrant to her point of origin or 
to another destination. The reversibility of migration is likely to induce 
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SOURCE: Data from Mohammed and Williamson (2004, Table 3). 
a greater volume of flows and a more diverse set of migrants. Tempo-
rary immigrants are likely to be more plentiful, and migrants can afford 
to travel farther away. Cheaper fares also promote tourism and the abil-
ity to learn about other unfamiliar regions of the world, facilitating sub-
sequent migration. But most importantly for our focus, reduced trans-
portation costs encourage continued interactions of migrants with their 
home communities, which is important for economic development—a 
point I argue in the next section. 
While reductions in transportation costs have significantly facili-
tated the transport of goods and people, reductions in communication 
costs have been even more substantial and have likely resulted in even 
greater changes in global economic relations. Table 3.1 displays tele-
phone rates for New York to London and New York to Buenos Aires 
(for a three-minute call) from the inception of telephone service in 
that market to 1981. The first two columns report nominal telephone 
rates, while the third and fourth columns express those same rates in 









were 130 times more expensive in 1927 relative to calls made in 1981. 
While the 1927 rate appears to be fantastically high, one must recall 
the capital stock that went into providing one telephone conversation at 
that time. For example, when telephone service was initiated from New 
York to San Francisco in 1915, the system could accommodate only one 
conversation at a time (Field 2006). 
The ease with which migrants can now keep in touch with individu-
als living far away has substantially changed the relations that migrants 
have with the family members that did not accompany them. Migrants’
ties with the home community are stronger and longer-lasting, with bet-
ter information flows in both directions. Migrants can remain abreast 
of the continuing or the sporadic needs of the family back home. News 
of sickness, marriages, or business opportunities can now be quickly 
and relatively cheaply communicated. Money transfers, whether from 
migrant to family or family to migrant, are easily tracked and made 
more secure by the ability of the sender to pair the money transfer with 
a telephone call to the recipient.6 And regardless of the migrant’s or the 
family’s ability to read and write, communication is easy and readily 
accessible. 
In their study of international trade, Freund and Weinhold (2004) 
find that the Internet has increased the rate of growth of exports. It 
is logical to also presume that the Internet has changed the nature of 
human migration. It has vastly increased the ability of individuals, with 
or without migration networks, to secure pertinent information prior to 
migration. By obtaining such information, migrants increase the odds 
of having a successful migration. The Internet has also vastly reduced 
the costs of keeping in contact with family and friends left behind. This 
is likely to ease the pain of separation, further inducing migratory flows. 
In sum, lower transportation costs and communications costs due to 
technological advances have had significant impacts on the environment 
in which international migration takes place. Lower transportation costs 
allow, of course, for a greater volume of overall migration, but also for 
more return migration. More temporary or short-term migration is also 
encouraged since migrants require smaller rewards in order to recover 
the costs of moving from one region of the world to another. Advances 
in communications technology keep migrants informed of home events, 
of the everyday or acute needs of the family, strengthening family and 
community migration networks, even among the illiterate. 
 
International Migration, Remittances, and Economic Development 47 
Table 3.1  Nominal and Real Telephone Rates from the Beginning of 
Telephone service to 1981 
Nominal prices for a Real prices for a 3-minute 
3-minute call from NY to: call from NY to: 
Year London Buenos Aires London Buenos Aires 
1927 75.0 — 793.1 — 
1928 45.0 — 484.2 — 
1929 45.0 — 484.2 — 
1930 30.0 36.0 330.5 396.6 
1931 30.0 30.0 363.1 363.1 
1932 30.0 30.0 402.9 402.9 
1934 30.0 30.0 411.9 411.9 
1936 21.0 21.0 277.9 277.9 
1937 21.0 21.0 268.3 268.3 
1939 21.0 15.0 277.9 198.5 
1940 21.0 15.0 276.0 197.1 
1941 21.0 15.0 262.8 187.7 
1944 21.0 12.0 219.5 125.4 
1945 12.0 12.0 122.6 122.6 
1946 12.0 12.0 113.2 113.2 
1952 12.0 12.0 83.3 83.3 
1959 12.0 12.0 75.8 75.8 
1960 12.0 12.0 74.5 74.5 
1965 12.0 12.0 70.0 70.0 
1967 12.0 12.0 66.1 66.1 
1968 12.0 12.0 63.4 63.4 
1970 9.6 12.0 45.5 56.9 
1972 9.6 12.0 42.2 52.8 
1973 9.6 12.0 39.7 49.7 
1974 3.6 8.0 13.4 29.8 
1975 3.6 8.0 12.3 27.3 
1976 3.6 8.0 11.6 25.8 
1977 3.6 8.0 10.9 24.2 
1978 4.5 8.0 12.6 22.5 
1980 4.8 7.0 10.7 15.7 
1981 3.0 4.5 6.0 9.1 
NOTE: Real prices are expressed in 2003 dollars. See note 5 for details. 
SOURCE: Nominal telephone rates are from Carter et al. (2006). Real telephone rates 





GLOBALIzATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
This section discusses a sampling of the channels by which migra-
tion and its by-products impact economic development. These channels 
have been fortified by the dramatic decreases in transportation costs 
that we have observed and by the improvements in communications 
technologies that continue to this date. These have greatly facilitated 
migration and the continued interactions between migrants living afar 
and the family back home. I begin with a discussion of migration’s 
impact on economic growth in origin communities and follow with how 
emigrants’ by-products affect growth and development back home. 
Cheaper transportation and better communications across countries 
help to lower barriers to migration and therefore have the potential to 
greatly expand the level of temporary international migration that takes 
place. Take, for example, the nearly threefold increase in foreign student 
enrollments in the United States (from 1.4 percent of all U.S. students 
for the 1954–1955 academic year to 3.9 percent of U.S. higher educa-
tion enrollment during the 2006–2007 academic year [Institute of Inter-
national Education 2006]). Undoubtedly, lower transportation costs 
and the ease with which parents and students can communicate despite 
great distances has aided in that growth. Reductions in nonpecuniary 
and monetary costs must improve the cost-benefit ratio, encouraging 
foreign study, the subsequent return home, and the eventual transmis-
sion, to poor countries, of technical and scientific expertise by students 
originating from those countries. 
The contribution toward economic development that students can 
make when they study abroad is not limited to the human capital that 
they repatriate home at the conclusion of their sojourn at universities 
abroad. Networks are created between these students and their profes-
sors, between international and domestic students, and between interna-
tional students from one country and international students from other 
countries. In today’s world, these networks are likely to prove stronger 
and longer lasting given the variety of ways by which we cheaply com-
municate to most areas of the world. Foreign study by students, there-
fore, results in the flow of knowledge and expertise to poor countries. 
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nearly costless forms of communication such as e-mail and Voice over 
Internet Protocol. 
At this juncture it is appropriate to ask whether poor countries also 
pay a price for the facilitated flow of students across countries. While it 
may be easier for students to flow from poor countries to rich countries 
to acquire education, the flow also can go in the other direction. Individ-
uals who have already received training or education in poor countries 
emigrate to richer countries with hopes of higher wages and expanded 
opportunities. This results in “brain drain,” weakening the prospects 
for development in poorer regions of the world as these nations lose 
scarce human capital. This concern is of paramount importance given 
that, as of late, developed countries have modified their immigration 
policies to favor skilled immigration over family reunification immi-
gration, stimulating the exodus of educated individuals from all areas 
of the globe. Given the expected income differentials to migration, the 
highly educated from poorer regions of the world are particularly moti-
vated. The origin communities are not only deprived of talented indi-
viduals, they are also put into the position of subsidizing human capital 
acquisition that ultimately benefits rich nations, since in many cases the 
education is acquired at the developing country’s expense. For exam-
ple, one estimate for 2004 suggests that 26 percent of Somali-trained 
physicians practice abroad. During that same year there were 4 physi-
cians per 100,000 persons in Somalia, a far cry from the U.S. ratio of 
300 physicians per 100,000 population (Docquier and Bhargava 2006). 
The possibility that easier emigration can strip poor countries of scarce 
resources that are important for development is a real concern. 
On the flip side of the brain drain debate is the argument that the 
emigration of the highly educated leads to “brain gain.” If there is the 
possibility of out-migration of the more highly educated (because of 
the possibility of accruing higher returns for one’s talents and expertise 
abroad), there will be greater competition for the “emigration slots,” 
leading to increases in overall investments in human capital accumu-
lation as individuals attempt to distinguish themselves from others 
vying for visas. Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997) argue that 
the resulting brain gain exceeds the brain loss. Others, including Schiff 
(2006), disagree that the gains are greater than the losses and see the 










Individuals who emigrate on a temporary basis can also bring home 
expertise acquired in ways other than through formal education. For 
example, McCormick and Wahba (2001) find that temporary emigrants 
who have worked abroad in previously unfamiliar labor markets return 
home not only with capital to begin new businesses, but also with entre-
preneurial abilities from that experience. By observing other forms of 
“doing business” and other uses of technology, emigrants learn how to 
become more flexible and to take advantage of opportunities that may 
await them in the communities to which they return. 
Foreign direct investment has also vastly expanded in today’s world, 
and it is often credited with promoting economic development in capital-
poor countries. But the acquisition of physical capital isn’t the only 
channel by which growth is stimulated when FDI takes place. Top-level 
managers, scientists, and engineers from the home office often accom-
pany FDI. In the process of putting in place the physical capital—
manufacturing the goods for sale and delivering the firm’s services— 
the home office employees tend to transfer technology and know-how 
from countries that tend to be well-endowed with these resources to 
more poorly endowed areas. 
Social remittances, “a local-level, migration-driven form of cul-
tural diffusion,” is yet another avenue by which migration may influ-
ence economic development (Levitt 1998). Return migrants resettling 
back home share ideas, technology, expectations, and familiarity with 
foreign institutions and foreign markets, which in turn can facilitate 
economic development. Those who visit home temporarily and com-
municate often with their families may also be helping to lift their home 
countries from poverty.7 
Emigration has also been found to stimulate trade in goods and 
services between pairs of labor exporting and labor importing nations 
(Mundra 2005). This type of international trade is sometimes referred to 
as “nostalgic trade.” Mexican immigrants in the United States yearning 
for traditional foods and beverages demand these in the U.S. market-
place, stimulating merchandise trade and promoting agricultural pro-
duction back home. After a while, these products can become known 
and favored by the host country population and stimulate that trade on a 
broader basis, as in the case of the popularity of Mexican cuisine in the 





International Migration, Remittances, and Economic Development 51 
An extremely important by-product of migration is the flow of 
money that immigrants send home. These are referred to as workers’
remittances and have gained the interest of bankers, academicians, and 
government policymakers. On a number of levels these flows have been 
credited with stimulating economic development. 
Earlier we established that temporary migration is likely to be stim-
ulated by the dramatic decreases that have taken place with respect to 
transportation costs. Likewise, by easing the continuation of contacts 
among families separated by long distances, reductions in communica-
tions costs make migration for the purpose of earning money abroad 
much more palatable. In short, increases in temporary migration to 
earn wages in a geographically distant land increase the flow of remit-
tances across borders. In addition, given that money transfers today 
are less costly and more secure, it is more likely that resources flow 
back home on a periodic basis. The receipt of remittances can contrib-
ute toward economic development by compensating for liquidity con-
straints often encountered in poorer regions of the world. Remittances 
have been linked to investments in existing businesses in the Domini-
can Republic as measured by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), 
while Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) find that the existence of migra-
tion networks (which they presume signals greater access to remittance 
receipts) appears to increase profits and capital investment in Mexican 
microenterprises located in urban areas. Remittances have also been 
linked to increases in educational investments in a number of studies, 
including studies using Haitian, Dominican, and El Salvadorian data. 
(See Amuedo-Dorantes, Georges, and Pozo [forthcoming]; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo [2009]; and Edwards and Ureta [2003], respectively.) 
Remittances have also been credited with reducing the incidence 
of “sudden stops” of capital inflows (Bugamelli and Paterno 2005). 
Countries that experience large inflows of remittances are thought to 
be less vulnerable to economic recessions and global crises given the 
belief that substantial levels of these flows are motivated by altruism. 
Altruistic inflows will tend to be countercyclical, reducing the damage 
that foreign investors may impart when they become concerned with 
a poorly performing economy and withdraw resources. The counter-
cyclical nature of the flows from the emigrants who remit are likely to 
be stronger if they are better informed about the immediate situation and 






that times are bad for their families, they will remit more. And as they 
learn that economic recovery is on the way, they are likely to remit less. 
It is logical to assume that cheaper and better communications have 
led to improvements in the timing of altruistic remittance inflows so 
that they can better serve in this countercyclical manner. Consequently,
it is plausible that remittances reduce the threat of currency crises. 
Foreign investors are less likely to behave in ways that destabilize the 
currency in the face of this vast force of remitters who will naturally 
provide resources to the family back home as unfavorable shocks hit 
the economy. 
Remittances have also been found to encourage the development of 
infrastructures that facilitate development. Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2009) 
purport to find that the channelling of substantial sums of money by 
emigrants to their families in Mexico has provided incentives for finan-
cial intermediaries to locate in the migrant sending areas. Financial 
intermediaries are in effect taking advantage of increased demand for 
services that result from the money inflows that emigrants send home. 
This is especially important in the case of Mexico, given that there has 
traditionally been relatively more out-migration in Mexico’s rural and 
less-developed areas of the country—the same areas that traditionally 
have been ignored by the banking system. 
DIsCussION AND CONCLusIONs 
Globalization has been progressing for some time, rising and fall-
ing, but it is certainly not unique to our times. The perception that 
growth in these economic interactions is of only recent vintage might 
originate from limiting ourselves to examining data from the latter half 
of the twentieth century, where these patterns are not obvious, driv-
ing us to conclude that globalization is a product of the past 50 or so 
years. In contrast, once we examine data from earlier time periods, we 
find that globalization through trade, finance, and migration has a much 
longer history. 
While the globalization process was certainly born before the past 
half century, there appear to be differences in the interactions of coun-
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focuses on international migration in particular, pointing to the context 
in which migration took place in the past relative to today. Technological 
advances have translated into widespread reductions in transportation 
and international communications costs. Migrants, potential migrants, 
and the families living back home all have access to much better infor-
mation, reducing the risks involved with migration and increasing the 
flow of information between families living in different parts of the 
world. This has the potential to greatly improve the lives of migrants, 
their families, and the communities from which migrants originate. 
Lower transportation and communications costs today keep emi-
grants abreast of events back home. Emigrants and the families from 
which they originate can easily and cheaply maintain ties with one 
another. Migrants know what is happening back home and what the 
needs of the family may be on a day-to-day basis. The families that 
remain in the home community have clearer perceptions of the lives 
and activities of their family abroad. In earlier time periods, these com-
munications were less accessible and likely caused greater numbers of 
migrants to lose touch with their families back home, leading to lower 
flows of resources back home and fewer instances of the return of infor-
mation that could be used to stimulate economic development. 
It is interesting that there have been substantial calls for globaliza-
tion in some dimensions and calls for restrictions in others. While argu-
ments are made in favor of unimpeded flows of capital and of goods 
across countries, the same cannot be said about people flows. Econo-
mists often lobby for the free flow of capital from areas where capital is 
abundant and earning lower returns to areas where capital is scarce and 
earning higher returns, but we do not as often and as vigorously argue 
that labor should move from areas where its return is lower to areas 
where its return is higher. While we tend to claim that international 
trade in goods and services is not a zero-sum game, but rather benefits 
both importing and exporting nations in the aggregate, we do not as 
consistently attribute likewise to the migrations of people. 
Despite the impediments to migration that we tend to observe, 
technological changes that have swept the transportation and commu-
nications sectors are likely to continue, propelling growth in migratory 
flows and their by-products. It is up to us to make the most of the poten-
tial gains from the movement of resources to areas where they reap the 









   
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	




1. For a discussion of the comparability of pre- and postwar data for the United 
States, see Romer (1986). 
2. For example, see Lemaitre (2005) for a discussion of the harmonization of migra-
tion statistics across countries and Alexander, Cady, and Gonzalez-Garcia (2008) 
for discussion of the IMF’s extensive program on data standards, harmonization, 
and dissemination. 
3. I obtained nominal inflows of remittances to Italy from Cinel’s (1991) historical 
account of Italian emigration, its impacts and by-products over the 1860 through 
1930 period. Cinel does not provide remittance amounts for each year. Data on 
Italian GNP were obtained from Mitchell (1998). I computed a remittance to GNP
value for each decade using the data that were available within each decade. 
4. The Mexican Central Bank reports that remittances to Mexico were US$23,969.5 
million in 2007 while its GDP stood at US$893,364 million. Remittances there-
fore accounted for only 2.68 percent of Mexico’s national income. 
5. Nominal telephone rates (for a three-minute call) are from Historical Statistics of 
the United States, series Dg60 and Dg63. Real telephone rates are computed by 
the author applying consumer price index series Cc1 from the same source. Given 
the base of the series, the rates are therefore expressed in 2003 dollars. 
6. In some markets, Western Union’s money transfer fee includes a three-minute 
telephone call from the sender of money to the money recipient. The call can be 
used, for example, to advise the recipient of the transfer, the amount being trans-
ferred, and how to retrieve it. 
7. Social remittance can also transfer undesirable habits and culture that can have 
detrimental impacts on growth and development, as in the case of the rise of 
gang violence thought to be imported to Central America from Los Angeles. See 
Archibold (2007). 
References 
Alexander, William E., John Cady, and Jesus Gonzalez-Garcia. 2008. The 
IMF’s Data Dissemination Initiative after 10 Years. Washington, DC: Inter-
national Monetary Fund. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, Annie Georges, and Susan Pozo. Forthcoming. 
“Migration, Remittances, and Children’s Schooling in Haiti.” The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, and Susan Pozo. 2006. “Remittance Receipt and 
Business Ownership in the Dominican Republic.” World Economy 29(7): 
939–956. 
———. 2009. “Accounting for Remittance Migration: Effects on Children’s 





	 	 	  
 
 
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  
	 	 	 	 	 	 	






 	 	 	 	
	 	 	  
 
	 	 	  
	 	 	  
International Migration, Remittances, and Economic Development 55 
Archibold, Ronald C. 2007. “Officials See a Spread in Activity of Gangs.” New 
York Times, February 8, A:14. 
Astorga, P., A. Bergés, E.V.K. Fitzgerald, and R. Thorp. 2002. Oxford Latin 
American Economic History Database. Oxford: Oxford University. http:// 
oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk/ (accessed November 23, 2009). 
Bugamelli, Matteo, and Francesco Paterno. 2005. “Do Workers’ Remittances 
Reduce the Probability of Current Account Reversals?” Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 3766. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Carter, Susan B., Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olm-
stead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright, eds. 2006. Historical Statistics of 
the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Cinel, Dino. 1991. The National Integration of Italian Return Migration, 
1870–1929. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Demirgüc-Kunt, Asli, Ernesto López Córdova, María Soledad Martínez Pería, 
and Christopher Woodruff. 2009. “Remittances and Banking Services: 
Evidence from Mexico.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
4983. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
DeParle, Jason. 2007. “Migrant Money Flow: A $300 Billion Current.” New 
York Times, November 18, WK:3. 
———. 2008. “World Banker and His Cash Return Home.” New York Times, 
March 17, A:1. 
Docquier, Frederic, and Alok Bhargava. 2006. “Medical Brain Drain: Physicians’
Emigration Rates, 1991–2004.” Washington, DC: World Bank. http://go 
.worldbankorg/9Y0NKDQK60 (accessed November 23, 2009). 
Edwards, Alejandra Cox, and Manuelita Ureta. 2003. “International Migra-
tion, Remittances, and Schooling: Evidence from El Salvador.” Journal of 
Development Economics, Special Issue (72)2: 429–461. 
Field, Alexander J. 2006. “Communications.” In Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Millennial Edition, Vol. 4. Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund 
Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin 
Wright, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 4-997–4-1059. 
Freund, Caroline L., and Diana Weinhold. 2004. “The Effect of the Internet on 
International Trade.” Journal of International Economics 62(1): 171–189. 
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, and Nina Pavcnik. 2007. “Distributional Effects 
of Globalization in Developing Countries.” Journal of Economic Literature
45(1): 39–82. 
Institute of International Education. 2006. “Open Doors 2006 Fast Facts.” 
New York: Institute of International Education. http://opendoors.iienetwork 
.org/?p=113122 (accessed August 18, 2009). 










	 	 	 	 	 	
 
	 	




	 	 	  
56 Pozo 
Statistics: Problems and Prospects.” OECD Statistics Brief No. 9. Paris: 
OECD. 
Levitt, Peggy. 1998. “Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level 
Forms of Cultural Diffusion.” International Migration Review 42(4): 926– 
948. 
McCormick, Barry, and Jackline Wahba. 2001. “Overseas Work Experience, 
Savings and Entrepreneurship amongst Return Migrants to LDCs.” Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy 48(2): 164–178. 
Mitchell, B.R. 1998. International Historical Statistics, Europe 1750–1993. 
New York: Stockton Press. 
Mohammed, S.I.S., and J.G. Williamson. 2004. “Freight Rates and Productiv-
ity Gains in British Tramp Shipping 1869–1950.” Explorations in Econom-
ic History 41(2): 172–203. 
Molina, David J. 2008. “The Recycling Centenarian Trio: U.S., Mexico,
China.” Unpublished manuscript. University of North Texas, Denton, TX. 
Mundra, Kusum. 2005. “Immigration and International Trade: A Semiparamet-
ric Empirical Investigation.” Journal of International Trade and Economic 
Development 14(1): 65–91. 
Romer, Christina D. 1986. “Is the Stabilization of the Postwar Economy a Fig-
ment of the Data?” American Economic Review 76(3): 314–334. 
Schiff, Maurice. 2006. “Brain Gain: Claims about Its Size and Impact Are 
Greatly Exaggerated.” In International Migration, Remittances, and the 
Brain Drain, Çaĝlar Ozden and Maurice Schiff, eds. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
Stark, Oded, Christian Helmenstein, and Alexia Prskawetz. 1997. “A Brain 
Gain with a Brain Drain.” Economics Letters 55(2): 227–234. 
Woodruff, Christopher, and Rene Zenteno. 2007. “Migration Networks and 




   
 
 
	 	 	 	
4 
Globalization and 
Inequality among Nations 
Joseph P. Joyce 
Wellesley College 
In 1870, at the beginning of the first modern era of globalization, 
the world’s average per capita GDP was $873 (see Table 4.1).1 Average 
income in the richest nations—the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand—was $2,419, while income in the poorest—the African 
nations—was $500, a spread of 5:1. By 1950, at the start of the second 
era of globalization, income had risen to $9,268 in the same upper-
income group, but only $890 in the African nations, and the spread had 
risen to 13:1. By 2003, the corresponding income levels were $28,039 
and $1,549, and the spread between the top and the bottom of the inter-
national distribution of income stood at 18:1. 
These aggregate figures masked even greater disparities among 
countries. In 2006, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country 
with a population of approximately 57 million people, had a GDP per 
capita of $649. That same year, France, with a population of 60 million, 
recorded per capita income of $28,877.2 The ratio of the income of the 
average French citizen to a citizen of the African country was over 40:1. 
The disparity in global income has become the focus of much scru-
tiny, inquiry, and debate. The questions that have arisen include: What 
are the causes of these disparities? Is inequality among nations a con-
sequence of globalization? How should the upper-income countries 
respond? 
Among those who have sought to answer these questions have been 
a number of noted philosophers, including Rawls (1999), Pogge (2002, 
2005), Risse (2005a,b,c) and Nussbaum (2006). Rawls, for example, 
in The Law of Peoples (1999), writes: “ . . . the causes of the wealth 
of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in 





Table 4.1  Per Capita GDP (1990 international dollars) 
1870 1913 1950 1973 2003 
Western Europe 1,960 3,457 4,578 11,417 19,912 
U.S., Canada, Australia, NZ 2,419 5,233 9,268 16,179 28,039 
Asia 556 696 717 1,718 4,434 
Latin America 676 1,494 2,503 4,513 5,786 
Eastern Europe & USSR 941 1,558 2,602 5,731 5,705 
Africa 500 637 890 1,410 1,549 
World 873 1,526 2,113 4,091 6,516 
Spread 4.8 8.2 13.0 11.5 18.1 
SOURCE: Maddison (2007). 
structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the indus-
triousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their 
political virtues” (p. 108). 
The “burdened societies” lack the ability to function at a level of 
economic activity which allows their citizens to secure the minimum 
levels of subsistence, shelter, health care, etc. Rawls (1999) contends 
that the “well-ordered” societies have a duty to assist these burdened 
nations. However, the duty is not a distributive one; rather, the goal of 
assistance is to help these nations manage their own affairs. 
Nussbaum (2006) criticizes Rawls for his assumption that states have 
equal standing in the global economy. She writes that to “ . . . assume 
a rough equality between parties is to assume something so grossly 
false of the world as to make the resulting theory unable to address the 
world’s most urgent problems . . .” (p. 235). She states that we need to
“ . . . acknowledge the fact that the international economic system, and 
the activities of multinational corporations, creates severe, dispropor-
tionate burdens for poorer nations, which cannot solve their problems 
by wise internal policies alone” (p. 240). 
Economic analysis cannot evaluate the philosophical merits of these 
different responses, but it can shed some light on the reasons for the dis-
parity across nations in income levels and the role of globalization in 
their propagation. A better understanding of the reasons for economic 
inequality can yield insights into the reasons why some nations prosper 
over time but others do not, and what could be done about this disparity. 
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This chapter reviews several studies that have sought to clarify these 
issues. 
The next section of this chapter offers a survey of the different 
explanations that have been offered to explain the disparity in global 
income and the results of empirical analyses that have sought to distin-
guish among them. The third section summarizes the research on the 
development of institutions, and the fourth section addresses the issue 
of how globalization affects the poor. The last section offers some sug-
gestions for how globalization can be managed to provide more oppor-
tunities for the poorest nations. 
sOuRCEs OF INEquALITy 
Inequality has long been a characteristic of the world economy. The 
differences in the levels of income per capita reflect variations in the 
growth of income in different regions, and these rates have also varied 
over time (see Table 4.2). The growth of per capita GDP in Western 
Europe, for example, rose to 1.33 percent during the first era of global-
ization, 1870–1913, and then fell to 0.76 percent during the time of the 
two world wars and the intervening period. But it rose fivefold to 4.05 
percent when globalization regained its momentum after 1950, before 
falling to 1.87 percent after 1973. Growth per capita in Asia rose from 
Table 4.2  Growth Rates of Per Capita GDP (%) 
1820–1870 1870–1913 1913–1950 1950–1973 1973–2003 
Western Europe 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.87 
U.S., Canada, 1.41 1.81 1.56 2.45 1.85 
Australia, NZ 
Asia −0.09 0.52 0.08 3.87 3.21 
Latin America −0.03 1.86 1.40 2.60 0.83 
Eastern Europe 0.63 1.18 1.40 3.49 −0.02 
& USSR 
Africa 0.35 0.57 0.91 2.02 0.32 
World 0.54 1.30 0.88 2.91 1.56 





0.08 percent during the wartime period to 3.87 percent from 1950 to 
1973 and 3.21 percent in the more recent era. Between 1950 and 2003, 
Asia’s share of world GDP more than doubled, from 18.6 percent to 
40.5 percent (see Table 4.3). 
The sources of economic growth have become the subject of much 
theoretical and empirical analysis in recent decades.3 Economists have 
sought to look beyond the short-term fluctuations of the business cycle 
to identify the determinants of a country’s productive capacity. Barro 
(1997), in a summary of the work that he and others have done on this 
topic, includes the initial level of per capita income, school enrollment 
rates, and changes in the terms of trade among the determinants of the 
growth of real per capita income. Theoretical studies have focused on 
the role of technological innovation in sustaining growth over time. The 
role of the financial sector in fostering development has also been the 
subject of much analysis (see, for example, Levine [1997]). 
More recently, economists have attempted to uncover the “deeper” 
determinants of economic growth that exercise their influence over long 
periods of time (see Table 4.4). The following factors have been identi-
fied as possibly fundamental: 
• Geography (Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup 2000; Sachs 2001). 
Many of the poorest countries are located near the equator. 
Countries in the tropic regions generally possess less fertile soil, 
unstable water supplies, and a larger incidence of diseases and 
other adverse conditions which impede their development. In ad-
Table 4.3  shares of World GDP (%) 
1870 1913 1950 1973 2003 
Western Europe 33.1 33.0 26.2 25.6 19.2 
U.S., Canada, 10.0 21.3 30.6 25.3 23.7 
Australia, NZ 
Asia 38.3 24.9 18.6 24.2 40.5 
Latin America 2.5 4.4 7.8 8.7 7.7 
Eastern Europe 12.0 13.4 13.1 12.8 5.7 
& USSR 
Africa 4.1 2.9 3.8 3.4 3.2 
SOURCE: Maddison (2007). 
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dition, those countries that are landlocked face higher transporta-
tion costs and less access to foreign goods and ideas. 
• Economic openness (Frankel and Romer 1999; Sachs and War-
ner 1995). Economies that are integrated with the world econ-
omy are open to technological advances, have the opportunity 
to specialize in the production of goods, and can take advan-
tage of economies of scale. Many of the fastest-growing East 
Asian economies have used international trade to accelerate their 
growth. 
• Institutions (Knack and Keefer 1995; North 1990). These are the 
rules and practices, both formal and informal, that govern behav-
ior. The institutions that promote property rights and an effec-
tive legal system encourage innovation by their inhabitants. The 
quality of governance provides an assurance of stability. 
Empirical researchers have sought to distinguish the relative impor-
tance of these factors in the determination and variation of income over 
time. This task is complicated by their interrelationships: geography, 
for example, can affect a country’s integration with the global economy 
and the evolution of its institutions. There can also be feedback between 
economic openness and the development of institutions. In order to iso-
late the effect of the different proposed determinants, economists look 
for instrumental variables that are exogenously correlated with eco-
nomic integration or institutions, but not the other possible determi-
nants of income, to test their relationships with output. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), for example, use the 
mortality rates of European settlers in their colonies to explain the vari-
Table 4.4  sources of Low Growth Rates 
Source Transmission mechanisms Authors 
Geography Soil fertility 
Water availability 
Health 
Economic Economies of scale 
openness Technological innovation 
Institutions Property rights 
Quality of governance 
Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup (2000) 
Sachs (2001) 
Sachs and Warner (1995) 
Frankel and Romer (1999) 
North (1990) 







ation in institutions. They reason that colonies that were located in areas 
with high disease rates were more likely to be “extractive states” where 
the colonizers sought to obtain natural resources with little develop-
ment of supportive institutions. Colonies with better health conditions, 
however, were more likely to be settled by Europeans who sought to 
replicate the institutions they had left behind. These early conditions 
influenced the evolution of institutions after the colonies achieved inde-
pendence. Using this identification strategy, Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson examine the determinants of per capita GDP in 1995 in 64 
countries, and report that institutional development had a positive and 
statistically significant impact: countries with better institutions had 
higher income levels. Geography and health conditions, on the other 
hand, were not significant. 
Similarly, Easterly and Levine (2003) undertake tests of the deter-
minants of per capita GDP in 72 countries using variables such as set-
tler mortality rates to explain institutional development. They report 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that institutions play a direct causal 
role in the determination of real per capita output. They also find that 
geographical factors only influence growth indirectly through their 
impact on institutions. In a third paper, Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2004) report that the quality of institutions “trumps” the other 
possible determinants of income, including openness and integration. 
While no consensus ever remains unchallenged, these studies pro-
duce consistent results. The World Bank (2005) has summarized the 
findings of this body of research: “Recent econometric and case stud-
ies have shown that even when controlling for historical endogeneity, 
institutions remain ‘deep’ causal factors, while openness and geography 
operate at best through them” (p. 57). 
INsTITuTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The econometric evidence, therefore, indicates that differences in 
institutional development account for the dispersion in global income. 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), however, caution that their 
results have limited practical guidance for those who wish to promote 
growth through improving the quality of institutions. They claim that 
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“there is growing evidence that desirable institutional arrangements 
have a large element of context specificity, arising from differences 
in historical trajectories, geography, political economy, or other initial 
conditions” (p. 157). 
In a survey of the research done on institutional development, Shirley 
(2005) summarizes the explanations that have been advanced for under-
developed institutions, such as colonial heritages plus resources that 
could be exploited by colonizers who designed institutions to appropri-
ate these resources; a lack of political competition, which would have 
placed constraints on political powers; and beliefs and norms that were 
not hospitable to the formation of institutions (p. 617). The proximate 
historical causes of institutional development, on the other hand, are 
greater equality combined with sufficient political competition to limit 
the ability of rulers to expropriate, combined with long periods of time 
(p. 625). 
Shirley (2005) also supports Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi’s
(2004) point that the development of institutions depends on domestic 
conditions. She cites several examples where the transfer of existing 
institutions from one country to another failed to take root, including 
the experience of Latin American countries with the U.S. constitution 
and the record of the transition economies with U.S. and European 
bankruptcy laws and commercial codes. She cites the need for what 
Levy and Spiller (1994) call a “goodness of fit” between specific insti-
tutional changes and a country’s overall environment. 
Outside agents, such as the intergovernmental organizations, have 
become aware of the need for good institutions for progress to be made 
in fostering growth and alleviating poverty. The World Bank undertakes 
extensive research on this topic and maintains databases on the qual-
ity of governance and institutions. The World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Report 2002, for example, was subtitled Building Institutions for 
Markets. But Shirley (2005) is pessimistic about the ability of foreign 
organizations to induce institutional improvement, since most insti-
tutional changes take place over longer time frames than the horizon 
of aid projects. Honda (2008) studies the impact of IMF programs on 
economic governance and finds no evidence of a significant impact for 
nonconcessional lending. Only the IMF’s concessional lending to the 
poorest countries had a significant impact on improving the rule of law 
and the control of corruption. 
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Another cautionary note comes from the literature on the impact of 
foreign aid on governance and development. Knack (2001) reports that 
higher aid levels had a negative impact on the quality of governance. 
Easterly (2006) has written extensively about the failures of foreign-
financed development projects to improve economic performance in 
the countries where they have taken place. Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
seem to have found a solution when they report evidence that aid was 
effective if the recipient countries had implemented good macroeco-
nomic and trade policies. But Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) 
find that those results were not robust to the addition of new countries 
and observations to the original data set. 
However, there may be long-term links between globalization and 
governance over time. Wei (2000), for example, looks at the impact of 
what he terms “natural openness,” that is, the level of trade openness 
that a country should have based on its size, geographic location, and 
linguistic characteristics. He finds a negative and significant linkage 
between natural openness and the prevalence of corruption, as measured 
by Business International and Transparency International corruption 
indexes. Wei attributes this linkage to decisions by more open econo-
mies to promote good governance and minimize corruption in order to 
advance their trade with other countries. He suggests that the process 
of globalization would provide similar incentives to other economies. 
Bonaglia, de Macedo, and Bussolo (2001) also examine the impact 
of openness (imports/GDP) on corruption, as measured by the Trans-
parency International and the International Country Risk Guide, and 
find that countries with a higher degree of openness record lower lev-
els of corruption. They caution, however, that reducing trade barriers 
may not bring an immediate reduction in corruption, and that domestic 
policies may be more important in the short run. Similarly, Al-Marhubi 
(2004) finds that countries that are more open have better governance. 
The IMF (2005), in an analysis of the determinants of institutional 
transitions, finds that trade openness is associated with a greater likeli-
hood of improved institutions. The authors attribute this to less corrup-
tion in the export sector and the reduction of the ability of domestic pro-
ducers to sustain monopolistic rents, which could be used to influence 
governments. They also find that transitions are more likely to occur 
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But international trade can also have negative effects on the devel-
opment of good institutions. Pogge (2002, 2005) points out that the sale 
of natural resources can support dictatorial regimes. First, the existence 
of such resources is an incentive for civil strife, as the winner can take 
control of state-owned properties, including publicly owned resources.
Second, the revenues received by an unrepresentative government 
allow it to remain in power, even in the face of dissent. 
Saudi Arabia, for example, received scores of 7 and 6 on the Free-
dom House 2007 ratings for political rights and civil liberties, where 
the ratings range from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (lowest).4 The 
government’s ability to remain in power rests in part on its oil revenues, 
which it uses to distribute services to the population. The dependence 
of energy consumers in the upper-income countries on foreign oil con-
tributes to the Saudi government’s survival. 
Globalization in earlier eras may have played a role in how institu-
tions evolved in those countries that were colonies. The maps of mod-
ern Africa and other areas were drawn by their former colonial pow-
ers when they existed. These national lines often ignored domestic 
ethnic divisions and other historical factors. The resulting geographic 
divisions were not consistent with past governing structures, and as a 
result domestic governments did not have a unified basis of support 
within their populations. An even more invidious cause of underdevel-
opment has been suggested by Nunn (2008), who finds evidence of a 
link between African poverty and slavery. He finds that those countries 
that were the major sources of slaves now are among the poorest, and 
suggests that the underdevelopment of political structures in the major 
slave-exporters may be a reason for this linkage. 
GLOBALIzATION AND THE POOR 
Even if institutions determine the level of economic activity in the 
long run, globalization can still have an impact on the poorer nations. 
The primary channel of transmission is the impact of globalization 
upon growth, and the evidence generally confirms that open economies 
grow faster and see a decline in the incidence of poverty (see Dollar and 






for almost all the significant reductions in poverty in the 1990s, includ-
ing those that occurred in China and India. 
However, the implications of this finding are the subject of much 
debate and controversy. In the 1980s, many policymakers and analysts 
believed that removing barriers to international trade and capital flows, 
as well as lifting regulations on interest rates and other market-oriented 
measures, would lead to faster growth. Many of these recommended 
policy measures were summarized by Williamson (1990) as the “Wash-
ington Consensus.”5 The experience of the East Asian economies that 
had grown so rapidly was cited as proof that integration with the global 
economy would raise growth in developing countries. 
But the record of the 1990s raised questions about the results of 
removing financial barriers. The financial crises that occurred, for 
example, in Mexico in 1994–1995, East Asia in 1997–1998, and Argen-
tina in 2001 severely depressed the standard of living in those countries. 
Baldacci, de Mello, and Inchauste (2002) have reported that such finan-
cial crises are linked to an increase in poverty and income inequality. 
These crises showed that short-term capital outflows could seri-
ously disrupt the economies of countries such as Thailand and Indone-
sia, which had removed controls on capital flows. On the other hand, 
China and India, both of which maintained capital controls, were rela-
tively unscathed by the crisis. Malaysia imposed capital controls during 
the crisis in 1998 to slow the flight of capital. While there were con-
cerns at the time that the country had cut itself off from future interna-
tional investments, its economy revived and international capital flows 
resumed. 
Subsequently, there was a reaction to what was called the “market 
fundamentalism” of the earlier period, particularly with respect to capital 
flows. The recent U.S. subprime mortgage crisis shows that even finan-
cial institutions in developed countries engage in risky transactions that 
can become full-blown crises. The IMF, which had previously encour-
aged its members to dismantle capital controls, revised its approach
(see Joyce and Noy [2008]). The Fund now emphasizes the sequencing 
of reforms before financial globalization in order to minimize financial 
sector instability. The reform measures include “ . . . the development 
of financial markets and institutions; prudential regulation and supervi-
sion; risk management and good practices in accounting, auditing, and 
disclosure; and financial safety nets” (IMF 2002, p. 3). 
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The impact of trade liberalization on the poorest nations is usually 
seen as more favorable, particularly for those that export agricultural 
goods. However, deregulation can affect some groups within a country, 
such as those who might pay higher food prices. Winters, McCulloch, 
and McKay (2004) review the evidence for all the linkages between 
trade liberalization and poverty, and present a carefully worded ap-
praisal: “Theory provides a strong presumption that trade liberalization 
will be poverty-alleviating in the long-run and on average. The empiri-
cal evidence broadly supports this view, and, in particular, lends no sup-
port to the position that trade liberalization generally has an adverse 
impact. Equally, however, it does not assert that trade policy is always 
among the most important determinants of poverty reduction or that 
the static and micro-economic effects of liberalization will always be 
beneficial for the poor” (p. 107). 
The impact of globalization on poverty and inequality, therefore, is 
far from settled, either among economists or the wider public. Aisbett 
(2007), who studies criticisms made of globalization, points out that
“ . . . much work remains to show which policies can reduce the adjust-
ment costs borne by the poor and maximize the share of the benefits they 
obtain from globalization” (p. 67). Bardhan (2006), who examines the 
linkages between poverty and globalization, concludes, “ . . . globaliza-
tion is not the main cause of developing countries’ problems, contrary 
to the claim of critics of globalization—just as globalization is often not 
the main solution to these problems, contrary to the claim of overenthu-
siastic free traders” (p. 90). 
MANAGING GLOBALIzATION 
Can globalization be managed to play a positive role in ending pov-
erty? Rodrik (2007) agrees with those who believe that growth is the 
most powerful mechanism to reduce poverty and that globalization pro-
vides opportunities for increasing growth rates. However, he also has 
pointed out that there are many different ways to achieve growth, and 
governments need to choose the policies and institutions appropriate 
for their nations to take advantage of the opportunities of globalization. 





of Easterly (2006), who criticizes outside attempts to impose solutions 
on countries. 
Are there steps the upper-income countries could take that would 
help the poor countries? Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian (2005) 
warn that some of the proposed measures, such as liberalizing trade, 
may not have the impact that their advocates envision. Many of the 
poorest countries, for example, are importers of agricultural products, 
and removing the subsidies paid to the agricultural sector within the 
United States and the European Union would only raise prices on those 
products at a time when world food prices are already rapidly rising 
(Economist 2008). 
On the other hand, Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian (2005) also 
point to concrete steps that would make the international economy more 
rewarding for poor countries. First, they claim that the upper-income 
nations can promote good institutions by monitoring and restricting the 
payments of bribes to officials in developing nations. Second, they pro-
pose that the governments of the wealthy countries promote research 
on issues and problems most relevant to the global poor but which their 
own governments cannot afford. One way to accomplish this would 
be to guarantee the purchase from private companies of technological 
innovations that benefit the poor. Finally, the current regulations that 
govern international migration should be overhauled. The governments 
of countries that attract migrants can collaborate with the governments 
of their home countries to devise contract labor schemes that allow 
workers to enter the host country for some period of time, benefitting 
both countries. 
Globalization will continue, with benefits for countries that may 
not have participated in the global economy to date. The World Bank 
(2007) estimates that the share of developing countries in global output 
will increase from about one-fifth to one-third by 2030. Similarly, it 
forecasts that the global trade of goods and services will rise by three 
times to approximately $27 trillion in 2030, and half of that increase 
will come from developing nations. 
However, the World Bank (2007) warns that the benefits of 
increased economic integration are likely to be uneven across different 
areas. In addition, the prevalence of inequality within nations may rise.
“[S]trong forces in the global economy may tend to increase inequality 
in many national economies. Even though a large segment of the devel-
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oping world is likely to enter what can be called the ‘global middle 
class,’ some social groups may be left behind or even marginalized in 
the growth process” (p. xvi). 
Managing the process of globalization to benefit the maximum 
number of people and diminish the gap in incomes across nations, 
therefore, is a challenge for all nations. This challenge has been exacer-
bated by the downturn in world trade and capital flows during the global 
financial crisis. How governments and intergovernmental organizations 
respond will determine whether that gap diminishes or grows larger 
over time. 
Notes 
1. These figures are taken from Maddison (2007) and are calculated in 1990 interna-
tional dollars. 
2. These data are obtained from the World Development Indicators and are calcu-
lated in constant 2000 dollars. 
3. Weil (2008) provides a comprehensive review of this subject. 
4. See http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
5. However, Williamson (1990) does not include the removal of controls on all capi-
tal inflows. 
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The Composition and Allocation 
of Global Financial Flows 
What Are Markets Doing? 
Linda Tesar 
University of Michigan 
This chapter focuses on global financial flows and how they have 
changed in response to the series of financial crises that swept through 
emerging markets in the mid- to late 1990s. There have been some sig-
nificant changes in the direction and the composition of capital flow, 
and this chapter argues that some of those changes can be understood 
as the response of markets to fundamental weaknesses in the global 
financial system—weaknesses that have not been adequately addressed 
by multilateral institutions or by individual governments. 
Development is fundamentally about moving resources to the 
places where they are needed most. Somehow the movement of those 
resources needs to be financed, whether as outright transfers, through 
loans, through direct investment in foreign corporations, or through 
securities markets. The nature of development finance has changed dra-
matically over time, and we have learned, sometimes through painful 
experience, about how the composition of capital flow from rich to poor 
countries matters. While the composition of capital flow is by definition 
a “macro” phenomenon, I suggest that micro evidence on the way firms 
structure their lending to emerging markets contains important clues 
about the vulnerabilities of the global financial environment, and how 
firms have responded to those weaknesses. 
The financial crises that swept through East Asia and Latin America 
in the mid- to late 1990s interrupted global flows, but one feature that 
stands out is the resilience of, and even the expansion of, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows. One can think of the policy reforms applied to 
emerging markets in two phases: first as the “Washington Consensus 
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I,” which emphasized getting prices right (the Washington Consensus 
is explained further in the following section). We learned from financial 
crises that getting prices right is not enough, and there is a new per-
spective that I have labeled “Washington Consensus II,” which is about 
getting institutions right. The world made progress with phase I, the 
opening of markets, but has been less successful with phase II. Failure 
to adequately address institutions has not stopped capital flow, but it has 
changed the nature of that flow. 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL FLOWs AND THE
WAsHINGTON CONsENsus 
Historically, flows to developing countries moved through offi-
cial channels—from multilateral agencies or governments to recipient 
governments. Bank lending and FDI played a role, but official flows 
accounted for the majority of capital flow to developing countries. In 
the 1990s, the composition of capital flow began to shift away from 
official assistance toward private capital flow. Much of this shift was 
due to the dramatic changes in policy that occurred under the “Wash-
ington Consensus,” a term coined by John Williamson (2002) at the 
Institute for International Economics. It was a convenient label for the 
broad set of policies supported by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF for 
reforming economies in emerging markets. 
The Washington Consensus covered three broad areas, the first of 
which was that developing countries should have greater macroeco-
nomic discipline, including a reduction in fiscal deficits, reprioritization 
of expenditures, and tax reform. The second major component was to 
encourage policies that foster the market economy to liberalize interest 
rates, liberalize the banking system, deregulate financial institutions, 
privatize government-run enterprises, and encourage greater securitiza-
tion. In other words, the reforms were intended to create a greater role 
for market-determined prices to affect allocations. One of the key prices 
in small open economies is the exchange rate, although the debate still 
ensues today about the best way to manage exchange rates. 
Finally, the consensus supported opening the economy to the global
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account liberalization. Ex post, there is now a heated debate about 
whether capital account liberalization is a good idea and if so, how it 
should best be accomplished, but ex ante, many economists believed 
that emerging market economies would benefit from lifting restrictions 
on the extent of foreign control, allowing foreigners to become share-
holders in local firms and encouraging the entry of foreign banks. In 
response to pressure from the IMF and other institutions, many coun-
tries undertook massive privatization programs and liberalized their 
capital markets. These privatization programs took place in conjunction 
with the removal of capital account restrictions that permitted increased 
market access to foreign investors. 
Economists predicted that such reforms would generate a number 
of benefits for emerging markets. Economic theory suggests that open-
ing to global financial markets should stimulate the flow of capital from 
capital-rich to capital-poor countries and reduce the cost of capital in 
markets where it is scarce. The reforms should increase the efficiency of 
the financial sector and facilitate the transfer of technology. A second-
order effect is to help diversify risk by reducing local investors’ expo-
sure to country-specific risk. At a minimum, these reforms, even if they 
do not change the long-run growth rate, would speed the transition to 
the country’s long-run steady state by an inflow of foreign capital. The 
more optimistic view is that financial liberalization and openness could 
potentially increase economic growth rates. 
Many countries took this policy advice and opened their markets. 
The number of countries with stock markets open to foreign investors 
increased from 14 in 1980 (essentially the largest OECD countries) to 
35 in 1992, leveling off to 41 in the late 1990s (Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad 2005). Chinn and Ito (2006) develop an alternative measure 
of openness, taking into account policy differences across countries in 
the various components of the capital account (see Figure 5.1). Their 
measure captures the opening of the capital accounts, particularly in 
Latin America and East Europe.1 
Net resource flows to developing countries, and most notably flows 
to emerging markets, increased dramatically from the early 1980s to 
the mid-1990s (see Figure 5.2). If we strategically stop time in 1997, it 
appears that capital flow responded as economists predicted it would: 
with a quadrupling of total flow from $75 billion in 1990 to over $300 
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increasing from less than $50 billion to more than $150 billion over the 
same period. International investment in portfolio equity, which was 
virtually nonexistent in the 1980s, accounted for an increasing share 
of capital flow in the early 1990s. At its peak in 1993, equity flows 
accounted for 20 percent of total capital inflow in developing countries. 
Privatization and increased foreign investment led to a boom in 
emerging stock markets. The growth in stock market capitalization of 
emerging markets, which reflects the increase in the number of firms 
listed on the market as well as the change in stock prices, was a stag-
gering 250 percent over the 1990–1996 period. The U.S. equity market, 
enjoying its own stock market boom over this period, grew about 170 
percent, with slower rates of growth in the United Kingdom and Japan. 
Foreign markets, particularly emerging markets, looked like a good 
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fraction of U.S. equities in the U.S. portfolio, declined from 97 percent 
in the 1980s to about 88 percent in 1995. 
Despite the increased flows to developing markets, international 
capital markets were still dominated by flows between industrialized 
countries. Of the total global outflow of FDI of $322 billion in 1995, 94 
percent, or $302 billion, was invested in industrialized countries. Simi-
larly, 96 percent of outward investment in portfolio equity was invested 
in industrialized countries. So, while there was some seepage of global 
flows into developing countries, the volume of that flow remained rela-
tively small. 
Capital markets also did not deliver on the promise of redistribut-
ing wealth from the rich to the poor. A Lorenz curve of the distribution 
of wealth for 59 countries, which shows the fraction of global wealth 
accounted for by each decile of countries ranked by wealth, shows very 
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the capitalized value of a country’s capital stock as well as its stock 
of foreign assets. If wealth were distributed approximately evenly, 
the poorest 10 percent of countries would have 10 percent of global 
wealth. (If the distribution were exactly equal, the Lorenz curve would 
lie along the 45 degree line and there would be no distinction between 
the rich and the poor.) The data suggest that 10 percent of global wealth 
is shared by the bottom 50 percent of countries. These figures are an 
underestimate of the uneven distribution of wealth, because the sample 
excludes most of sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest countries in Asia, and 
Eastern Europe because of the lack of information on capital stocks and 
net foreign assets in those regions. 
Even if one thought that wealth might not be affected by the open-
ing of capital markets, one would hope that the allocation of capital 
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investment in capital-scarce countries even if ownership of that capital, 
and therefore wealth, remained in the hands of investors in industrial-
ized countries. Unfortunately, the data suggest that there was also very 
little change in the distribution of capital across countries between 1970 
and 1995. In 1995, the richest 50 percent of countries accounted for 85 
percent of the global capital stock. 
Of course, the clock did not stop in the mid-1990s, and beginning 
with the Mexican crisis in December 1994, global markets were buf-
feted with a series of financial shocks that seemed to spread from one 
market to the next. These crises resulted in (or some would say were 
caused by) a sudden reversal of capital flow from emerging markets, 
speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates and the central banks that 
supported them, collapses in the financial sectors of many Latin Ameri-
can and Southeast Asian countries, liquidity crises, and ultimately 
widespread defaults. The cause of these crises remains a topic of heated 
discussion and is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The “sudden stop” in capital flow to emerging markets resulted in a 
dramatic reduction in total flows to developing countries, from a peak 
of $310 billion in 1997 to less than $200 billion in 2001. Flows of long-
term debt fell in 1999 and became negative in 2001. Portfolio equity 
flows were reduced to a trickle. Interestingly, while the other types of 
flow declined, FDI remained steady from 1997 on and took a sharp 
turn upward in 2003. This is seen even more clearly when one looks 
at the decomposition of flows by type (i.e., as a percentage of total 
flow). Throughout the entire 1980–2001 period, FDI as a fraction of 
total inflow steadily increased, and by 2001 it accounted for 80 percent 
of the total volume of flow to developing countries. The remainder of 
the chapter examines why, and how one should think about FDI flows 
in this environment. 
To understand FDI flows, it helps to make the distinction between 
greenfield investments, the inflow of new investments, and “brown-
field” investments, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that reflect the 
purchase of existing plants and equipment. Throughout the late 1990s 
the fraction of FDI that is accounted for by the acquisition of firms 
in emerging markets by firms in industrialized countries increased. In 
1999, over 90 percent of FDI in Asia was due to cross-border M&As. 
The rise in cross-border M&As as a form of external finance was 




In many countries in East Asia, foreign investors were explicitly pro-
hibited from gaining a controlling share in local firms. For example, in 
1996 the ceiling on the amount of stock foreigners could acquire in all 
Korean companies without the approval of the board of directors was 
only 18 percent. Another feature of the market for corporate control in 
Korea was that cross-holdings across business groups (Chaebols) were 
substantial. This situation changed dramatically as a consequence of 
the financial crises that swept the region during 1997. The IMF bailout 
packages to Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia included explicit provi-
sions for restructuring domestic capital markets and to allow foreign 
competition in the market for corporate control. 
Another feature of FDI inflows is that they are lumpy; that is, a 
single transaction in a small market can have a huge impact on aggre-
gate flow. Argentina is an interesting example. In 1999, forecasts about 
Argentina’s near economic future and the viability of its currency board 
were grim. Debt flows steeply declined and portfolio inflows turned 
negative. Foreign direct investment, however, surged upward to unprec-
edented levels. A careful look at the data reveals that the sale of YPF, 
an oil and gas company, to Repsol, a Spanish enterprise, accounted for 
63 percent of total FDI inflow in that year. Had Repsol not made the 
purchase, net flows to Argentina would have been close to zero. 
The next question is how to interpret the boom in foreign acquisi-
tions in emerging markets. Many views in the press range from firms 
now having access to the “exciting opportunities” in emerging markets, 
to a fire sale of assets resulting from the liquidity crises, to the fear of 
“recolonization” by foreign entities (the latter is attributed to Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister Mahathir). Economists also express a range of opinions, 
from FDI as the “good cholesterol” (borrowing may not be good for 
you, but if you have to do it FDI is the least dangerous form) to a more 
neutral perspective (FDI is simply the transfer of assets from domestic 
to foreign hands and therefore may have little real economic impact) to 
a more positive view that FDI enables the transfer of technology and 
creates synergies between parents and their affiliates. 
To try to shed light on the factors that drive cross-border M&As, I 
explore three questions. First, is there value creation from the transfer 
of assets from domestic to foreign hands? Second, if there is value cre-
ation, who captures the gains—targets in emerging markets or acquir-
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stances under which gains exist, and why? To get at these questions, 
I will use the stock price reaction of acquirer and target firms to the 
announcement of an M&A transaction as a summary statistic for the 
value created through cross-border M&A activity. 
The results in this chapter are drawn from Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar
(2009). The returns are cumulated average abnormal returns over a 
three-day event window around the announcement date.2 Our data set 
includes all acquisitions of firms in 42 emerging markets in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America by firms from nine industrialized countries. The sam-
ple period covers 1986–2006, making it possible to test for the effects 
of financial crisis on the gains from an acquisition. The data set includes 
various firm, industry, and transactions characteristics. We also have 
data for a control group that includes domestic and other industrialized-
country acquisitions by U.S. and European firms. This allows us to com-
pare the gains from acquiring a target in an emerging market relative to 
the gains from acquiring a target in another industrialized country. 
Our analysis yields three main findings. First, there is value cre-
ation from cross-border M&As in emerging markets. Between 1986 
and 2006, developed market acquirers experienced positive and sig-
nificant abnormal returns of 1.16 percent, on average, over a three-day 
event window. 
Our second finding is that shareholders of acquiring firms reap the 
lion’s share of the gains, and this gain is associated with acquiring con-
trol. The median acquirer records cumulative abnormal returns of 0.72 
percent in transactions where control is acquired, while the median 
cumulative abnormal return for acquirers in transactions where control 
is not acquired is 0.02 percent. Over the period we study, the cumu-
lated dollar value gain from cross-border acquisitions in emerging mar-
kets where control was acquired was $10.5 billion for developed mar-
ket shareholders. Note that this is in stark contrast to the results from 
the domestic M&A literature where studies find that M&As are value 
destroying and that the gains, if any, accrue to the target’s shareholders 
(Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2005). This suggests that something 
very different is going on in the emerging market context. The effect 
appears to be closely related to corporate control. 
Finally, we find that the gains for acquirers are largest in R&D 
intensive sectors, conditional on gaining control. To obtain this result, 
we first estimate R&D intensity at the industry level based on a cross-
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section of U.S. industries. We then use those estimates as a measure of 
R&D intensity of targets (by industry). When we include this measure 
of R&D intensity as a control variable in the regression, we find that 
corporate control, crossed with R&D intensity, is a significant explana-
tor of acquirer gains. One interpretation of this finding is that there are 
productive synergies from M&As that involve the transfer of technol-
ogy, but these synergies are only realized (and the technology is trans-
ferred) when the acquirer obtains control. 
How can we interpret these findings? In Financial Crisis, Liquid-
ity and the International Monetary Problem, Jean Tirole (2001) offers 
insight into the potential causes of market failure in emerging markets 
that has direct bearing on the decision to acquire a foreign firm. First, 
he assumes that there are many lenders, and that lenders do not coor-
dinate their actions. On the borrowing side, he assumes that the local 
government can take actions that affect the payoffs of the firm, and that 
the incentives of the government are not fully aligned with those of the 
firm. Two problems then arise. First, the lack of coordination among 
lenders means that each lender is uncertain about the borrowing coun-
try’s overall level of indebtedness, and each lender is uncertain about 
the relative seniority of his or her own claim. This situation can lead to 
sunspot equilibria, speculative attacks, and contagion as each investor 
tries to infer from inexact signals whether or not his or her claim will be 
honored. The second problem is that lenders would like to contract with 
the firm, but the government is an implicit partner in the arrangement. 
Thus, the lender is exposed to expropriation risk; that is, actions that are 
not in the best interest of the firm. 
Foreign direct investment, in the form of acquiring control of the 
emerging market firm, offers a way out of these two problems. By con-
tracting explicitly with the shareholders of the target firm, FDI essen-
tially cuts out other lenders (minimizing the multiple lender problem). 
In gaining majority ownership of the firm, shareholders of the acquir-
ing firm are able to extend the boundary of the firm into the emerging 
market, effectively replacing the government of the target-firm nation 
with that of the acquirer. This is not to say that all expropriation risk 
is eliminated—the target’s government could still violate international 
law, for example, and nationalize the target. But by consolidating the 
balance sheets of the target and the acquirer, the acquisition effectively 




The Composition and Allocation of Global Financial Flows  83 
market. In a sense, the target imports the corporate and legal institutions 
from the acquirer. 
Foreign direct investment is not, however, a panacea for the weak 
institutions problem plaguing emerging markets. It is relatively immo-
bile, may be inflexible, and may not help a country diversify its risk. 
It also comes at a price. In order to attract FDI and to compensate for 
the weak institutions problem, target shareholders in emerging markets 
give up both control and, relative to target shareholders in industrial 
countries, returns. The only complete solution is for governments in 
emerging markets to address the weaknesses in their contracting envi-
ronment, to offer greater property rights protection, and to make firms 
less vulnerable to capricious changes in government policy. 
Another recent phenomenon, which I believe is also a symptom of 
the weak institutions problem, is the dramatic rise in foreign reserve 
accumulation in developing countries. According to neoclassical theory,
capital-scarce countries should be net borrowers, not net lenders. Yet 
what we see is the accumulation of large holdings of dollar reserves by 
foreign governments, particularly in developing countries. Economists 
continue to debate about the explanation of these reserve holdings, but 
one plausible explanation is that in a world where financial meltdowns 
are a possibility, foreign reserves serve as collateral and provide a sig-
nal to foreign investors that the countries’ balance sheets are sound. 
suMMARy
The composition of global financial flows to emerging markets 
changed dramatically in the postfinancial crisis period. External finance 
is now much more likely to take the form of the sale of domestic assets, 
with control rights shifting to the acquiring firm. In my view, this 
change in the composition of flows is a natural response to institutional 
weaknesses in emerging markets. Control of foreign subsidiaries allows 
for both capital flow and for the protection of property rights of the 
acquiring firm, but it is not a perfect substitute for strong institutions 
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Notes 
1. For more details on their index, see Chinn and Ito (2006). 
2. Our working paper includes robustness checks for different windows around the 
announcement date. 
References 
Bekaert, G., C. Harvey, and C. Lundblad. 2005. “Does Financial Liberalization 
Spur Growth?” Journal of Financial Economics 77(1): 3–55. 
Chari, A., P. Ouimet, and L. Tesar. 2009. “The Value of Control in Emerging 
Markets.” Review of Financial Studies 21(2): 605–648. 
Chinn, M., and H. Ito. 2006. “What Matters for Financial Development? Capital
Controls, Institutions, and Interactions.” Journal of Development Econom-
ics 81(1): 163–192. 
Global Development Finance. Various issues. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. 
Lane, P., and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti. 2001. “The External Wealth of Nations: 
Measures of Foreign Assets and Liabilities for Industrial and Developing 
Nations.” Journal of International Economics 55(2): 263–294. 
Moeller, S., F. Schlingemann, and R. Stulz. 2005. “Wealth Destruction on a 
Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger 
Wave.” Journal of Finance 60(2): 757–782. 
Tirole, J. 2001. Financial Crisis, Liquidity and the International Monetary 
Problem. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Williamson, J. 2002. “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?” Speech given 







Countries Converging on 
Intellectual Property Rights? 
Evidence from Plant Patents, 1977–2007 
Lisa D. Cook 
Michigan State University 
For decades, researchers have attempted to develop better, more 
efficient sources of biofuels. On one hand, this development could rep-
resent a significant boon for developing countries. For example, sor-
ghum in the Philippines has been found to have higher sugar content 
in its root than sugar cane, which is one of the best sources for effi-
cient production of cellulosic biofuels. Economists have long advised 
developing countries, among others, to become less dependent on fossil 
fuels, whether in consumption or production. In addition, some types 
of biofuels may increase opportunities in production, employment, and 
research in the home country. 
On the other hand, this could be problematic for developing coun-
tries. Provisions of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS) to increase protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights in developing countries and emerging markets have been 
expensive to implement. Finger (2004) estimates that the annual cost 
to the least developed countries would be $60 billion. Nogués (1993) 
finds that Argentine pharmaceutical consumers transfer $425 million 
yearly to foreign patent holders. With little home-country capacity or 
legal framework to issue patents and protect ideas, foreign (and domes-
tic) residents may seek greater protection abroad. Such a move could 
increase the price of both R&D and the use of plant varieties, reducing 
gains to output, employment, and R&D. Despite widespread ratification 










ing countries argue that royalties are still underpaid due to biopiracy 
and bioprospecting. 
How have developing countries responded to the opportunity and 
challenge of greater intellectual property protection? Have foreign pat-
ent offices become complements or substitutes for domestic patent 
offices? This chapter examines the empirical record of this response. 
Using data on intellectual property related to plants, I find that 
there is increased activity in protecting intellectual property in and by 
developing countries after laws related to intellectual property are intro-
duced. In Brazil, India, and Mexico, there is a noticeable TRIPS effect. 
Protected inventions increased at home and abroad after TRIPS passage 
in 1997. This finding implies that foreign patent offices are comple-
ments in most countries. 
The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section briefly 
describes the methods available to protect ideas related to plants, and 
the second section describes the data on intellectual property. The third 
section presents the evidence, and the last section describes opportuni-
ties for future research. 
PROTECTION OF PLANTs 
The TRIPS agreement states that “Members shall provide for the 
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui 
generis system or by any combination thereof.” There are four main 
means by which plant-related innovations may be protected: 1) patents, 
2) plant breeders’ rights (PBR), 3) trade secrets, and 4) trademarks. 
Among patents, there are two types that are relevant for plants: util-
ity and plant. Utility patents are granted to plant-related inventions that 
meet the standards of novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness. These 
can either be process, such as a method of using a plant or plant part 
in a breeding process that includes a step of sexual hybridization, or 
product, such as plant, seedling, plant seed, or plant part, per se, pat-
ents.1 According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, plant patents 
are for products only and are granted to inventors who have “invented
or discovered and asexually reproduced a distinct and new variety 
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Among developed countries, only the United States, Japan, and Austra-
lia recognize plant patents, and no developing country recognizes them 
(World Bank 2006, p. 25). 
The criteria for plant variety protection (PVP) are uniformity, sta-
bility, and distinctness. TRIPs compliance requires that countries offer 
some form of protection to breeders, and many countries selected this 
option. Plant variety protection is the principal means by which plants 
are protected in the EU and in many developing countries. The first 
plant variety act was enacted in 1973, and many of these countries have 
joined or are in the process of joining the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). Others, such as India, 
Taiwan, and Thailand, have adopted national PVP programs. While 
PVP certifications are considered less restrictive than patents, costs 
associated with application vary significantly and can be prohibitive. 
The application fee represents 3 percent of GDP per capita in China and 
Colombia and 16 percent in Kenya. The annual maintenance fee repre-
sents up to 13 percent of GDP per capita in China, 16 percent in Kenya, 
and 0 percent in the United States.3 
Trade secrets are another way plants might be protected. That is, 
fines may be imposed if nonpublic information about plant varieties is 
made public. This type of protection is often sought when replication is 
difficult, such as with hybrids. 
Trademarks and geographic designations are words or symbols 
used to identify novel or geographic characteristics of plant varieties 
to consumers—for example, Michigan cherries, Egyptian cotton, and 
Ethiopian coffee. 
While all aforementioned forms of protection are simultane-
ously possible, the focus of the analysis here will be patents and PVP
certifications. 
DATA 
Patents for innovations related to plants are prohibited in most 
countries in our sample. Therefore, all patent data used in this analysis 
are patents issued to residents of developing countries and emerging 








patents, application data are only available from 2002. Rejection rates 
are calculated as the ratio of patent grants to patent applications in a 
given year. The rejection rate is intended to capture the quality of plant 
patents being issued by the United States. 
Data on PVP certifications have been obtained from UPOV and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Data on laws related 
to laws and agreements have been collected from the CBD, Farmers’
Rights, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N., WIPO, and 
the WTO. 
Additional data, such as patents per resident and R&D expenditure 
as a fraction of GDP, have been gleaned from various sources to present 
the broader context in which decisions about plant-related intellectual 
property protection are being made. 
EVIDENCE 
Table 6.1 provides background data on the 14 developing countries 
and emerging markets in the sample. There is significant heterogeneity 
among countries for all measures: income per capita, share of agricul-
ture in GDP, patents granted to residents per million, R&D expenditure 
as a fraction of GDP, and number of R&D researchers per million. 
Since 1975, the quantity of plant-related innovations receiving 
intellectual-property rights protection has been rising in emerging mar-
kets and developing countries both at home and abroad. Figure 6.1 
reports data on plant patents obtained in the United States, utility pat-
ents related to plants obtained in the United States, and PVP certifica-
tions issued in the home country. The patterns observed in the data sug-
gest that innovations with weaker protection, PVP certifications, began 
to increase earlier than those seeking stronger protection through pat-
ents issued in the United States. While plant and utility patents began to 
rise significantly in the mid-1990s, PVP certifications began climbing 
significantly in the mid-1980s. Interestingly, the PVP data correspond 
more closely to plant and total patenting patterns in the United States, 
and the patent data in this sample follow plant and total plant patenting 
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Figure 6.2 gives data on applications for, grants of, and rejection 
rates for plant patents. Although patent protection of plant innovations 
is increasing, it is unclear whether the quality of these innovations is 
increasing. While the rejection rate as calculated is an imperfect mea-
sure of quality of innovations, it should give an indication of whether 
simply more plant-related ideas are seeking protection rather than better 
ideas. The high degree of variation between 2002 and 2006, the only 
years for which there are data, makes inference difficult. Rejection 
rates for all U.S. utility patents are available for a longer period and are 
recorded in Figure 6.3. Rejection rates were largely stable at around 60 
percent in the 1990s but climbed to 70 percent by the mid-2000s.4 
Developing countries and emerging markets have received plant-
related utility patents in all subcategories. However, shares attributed 
to developing countries and emerging markets are relatively low in 
most subcategories and are largest in mushrooms, pepper, and conifers. 
These data appear in Figure 6.4. 
For each country, we are interested in answering the following 
questions: Are there significant differences in intellectual-property pro-
tection sought at home and abroad? Do inventors respond to measures 
adopted to increase protection of plant-related ideas? Are these patterns 
different across countries? Figures 6.5–6.10 present data for each coun-
try in the sample and include dates of implementation of the UPOV, 
TRIPS, CBD, and national PVP certifications. 
For Argentina and Brazil, most of the activity in IP protection of 
plants is in PVP certifications. In both countries, plant-related utility 
patents rose after 1999. Among the countries in the sample, Argentina 
and Israel are the earliest users of plant protection in the home coun-
try. In India and Taiwan, all the activity related to protection of plant 
innovations is in protection sought abroad. For Brazil, India, and Mex-
ico, nearly all plant IP activity is concentrated in the post-TRIPS era. 
Following membership in UPOV, PVP certificates in Israel rose above 
nonzero levels consistently for more than 20 years. Of course, a formal 
multivariate econometric test would be warranted to ascribe causality, 
but the country-specific graphical analysis is suggestive. 
The findings in this study are broadly consistent with the recent 
literature on plant-related intellectual property rights, such as Helfer 




      







90  Table 6.1  Country Data, Developing Countries, and Emerging Markets 
GDP per Patents granted R&D Researchers in 
capita, PPPa Agriculture to residents per expenditure R&D per million 
$US % GDP million population % GDP population 
2005 2005 2005 2000–2005 1990–2005 
All developing countries 1,939 11.1 — 1.02 — 
East Asia and the Pacific 2,119 6.4b,c — 1.61 722 
Latin America 4,480 8.7d — 0.56 256 
and the Caribbean 
High income 34,759 1.7b 286 2.45 3,781 
Middle income 2,808 9.6 — 0.85 725 
Low income 610 21.4 — 0.73 — 
Israel 17,828 3.0 48 4.46 — 
Argentina 4,728 9.4 — 0.41 720 
Chile 7,073 5.5 1 0.61 444 
Costa Rica 4,627 8.7 — 0.39 — 
Mexico 7,454 3.8 1 0.40 268 
Brazil 4,271 8.1 1 0.98 344 
Colombia 2,682 12.5 — 0.17 109 
Thailand 2,750 9.9 1 0.26 287 
Ecuador 2,758 6.5 — 0.07 50 
Indonesia 1,302 13.4 — 0.05 207 
Honduras 1,151 13.9 — 0.05 — 




India 736 18.3 1 0.85 119 
Taiwan 16,067 1.7 1,865 2.26 3,972e 
a Purchasing power parity. 
b 2004 data. 
c Asia (excluding Middle East). 
d Only Latin America. 
e 1998–2005 data. 
SOURCE: Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5: World Bank (2007); aggregates calculated from UNDP (2008). Column 3: UNDP (2008). Data on 
Taiwan are from Food and Fertilizer Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region (2008) and Taiwan Intellectual Property Office 
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U.S. plant patents issued to developing countries
U.S. utility patents (plant related)  issued to developing countries
PVP certifications in developing countries issued to their own 
92 Cook 
Figure 6.1 Intellectual Property Related to Plants, Developing Countries 













































































       
. . la t ate ts iss e  t  e el i  c tries 
. . tilit  ate ts ( la t relate ) iss e  t  e el i  c tries 
 certificati s i  e el i  c tries iss e  t  t eir  resi e ts 
NOTE: Developing countries and emerging markets for U.S. utility and plant patents 
data are Israel, Costa Rica, India, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Indone-
sia, Chile, Honduras, Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand, and Ecuador. Developing countries 
and emerging markets for PVP certification data are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Israel, Mexico, and South Africa. Patent origin is determined by the 
residence of the first-named inventor in case of U.S. plant patent and by the residence 
of any inventor in case of U.S. utility patent (plant related). PVP certifications are 
presented by grant year. 
SOURCE: U.S. Plant patents, 1994–present: UPOV (2009); before 1994: Patent Tech-
nology Monitoring Team. PVP certifications, 2002–2006: UPOV (2009); 1975–2001: 
WIPO (n.d.). U.S. utility patents related to plants: Data retrieved by the author from 
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Figure 6.2  u.s. Plant Patents, Grants and Applications, Developing 







































1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 
U.S. plant patents granted U.S. plant patent applications Rejection rate 
NOTE: Developing countries and emerging markets are Israel, Costa Rica, India, South 
Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Indonesia, Chile, Honduras, Mexico, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Ecuador. 





Figure 6.3  u.s. utility Patents, Grants and Applications, Developing 
Countries and Emerging Markets, by Grant year, 1965–2006 
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Figure 6.4  u.s. utility Patents Issued to Developing Countries and 
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the conventional wisdom is that developing countries prefer weaker IP
rights and that these will spur innovation. This analysis suggests that a 
more nuanced and time-series investigation of the empirical record is in 
order and that the issue is not settled. 
CONCLusION 
An examination of data on intellectual property related to plants 
finds that there is increased activity in protecting intellectual property 
in and by developing countries. This finding implies that foreign pat-
ent offices are complements in most countries. In Brazil, India, and 
Mexico, there is a noticeable TRIPS effect, and protected inventions 
increase at home and abroad after TRIPS passage in 1997. From the 
data it is difficult to glean implications for taking advantage of new bio-
fuel opportunities, for example, beyond protection of ideas. Were these 
preexisting ideas or new ideas seeking protection? Did new knowledge 
arise as a result of new protection or in spite of it? What are the results 
with respect to commercialization? This is still an open research ques-
tion and deserves further attention in future research. 
Notes 
The author is grateful to seminar participants at the Werner Sichel Lecture Series 
at Western Michigan University and in the Department of Economics at Michigan 
State University. Excellent research assistance by Chaleampong Kongcharoen is also 
acknowledged. 
1. The scope of per se patents is not only the application identified but applications 
not yet identified. 
2. USPTO definition, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/plant/. 
3. World Bank (2006), UNDP (2008), and author’s calculations. GDP per capita data 
are for 2005. 
4. One must be careful in interpreting the data on rejection rates, as applications and 
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Are we preparing our younger generations for the challenges and 
opportunities of the twenty-first-century global markets? As markets 
become increasingly global, tough competition for every skill is emerg-
ing from around the world. But fascinating opportunities are also being 
formed to serve people in different corners of the globe in new ways. 
Are we, as a society and as individuals, developing the right skills and 
procedures to deal with the upcoming challenges and to take advantage 
of the new global opportunities? Or are we about to see our jobs out-
sourced and our lives face greater uncertainty? 
These are critical questions that all of us living in the early twenty-
first century have to grapple with, one way or another. Global trends 
have come to matter in significant ways in our career choices and busi-
ness decisions, as well as government policies that we advocate. To 
think through these issues and to make informed choices as profession-
als and citizens, we need to have a basic understanding of the main forces
behind global market dynamics. The literature on globalization offers 
many perspectives that highlight such forces from different angles. This 
chapter brings together a host of those perspectives and makes new 
observations regarding the current and future globalization trends. To 
start the discussion, it is useful to briefly review the key trends and les-








PAsT GLOBALIzATION TRENDs 
The most notable forces behind globalization are improvements in 
transportation and information technologies that have brought different 
parts of the world into closer contact with each other. This has enabled 
companies in each country to see the world market within their reach 
and to think globally when choosing what processes to keep inside the 
firm, where to locate, and which processes to outsource domestically or 
internationally. Such considerations are not just for large corporations 
such as Caterpillar or Archer Daniels Midland. Small firms and indi-
viduals also need to be aware of their positions in global markets. Many 
industries, such as auto parts, have long been involved in that process. 
More recently, many products and services that previously enjoyed nat-
ural protection in each locality, such as retail sales, have come to face a 
much wider competition. 
Technology, however, is not the entire story behind globalization. 
Government policies and institutional developments have also played 
major roles. Even decades ago, when transportation and communica-
tions costs were high, they were often minor compared to the myriad of 
barriers erected by governments to protect domestic industry or to gen-
erate rents and collect revenue. Those barriers have markedly declined 
since World War II. Government action has also mattered in terms of 
streamlining domestic regulation, law and order, and control of corrup-
tion and extortion (or security of property rights in general). Globaliza-
tion would not have been possible without expanding public support 
for liberal trade and without increasing government ability to invest in 
public goods and to bring order, efficiency, and security to domestic 
markets. 
What accounts for the change in public attitudes and the improve-
ment in government capabilities? Concerning attitudes toward trade 
policy, the important factors have been improvements in the opera-
tion of labor and capital markets and the expansion of social insur-
ance mechanisms such as unemployment insurance and social security. 
These factors have mattered because they have reduced the costs of 
external shocks on domestic producers. Under liberal trade, innovations 
and entries and exits in global markets often force local producers to 
respond and compete or go out of business. In either case, access to effi-
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cient sources of credit and insurance can reduce the costs imposed on 
local firms and workers and enable them to withstand external shocks, 
adjusting to them or moving to new localities and lines of business 
where they can compete more effectively. The enhanced efficiency of 
capital and labor markets and the expansion of social insurance over 
the past several decades have eased such adjustments and account for 
the increased palatability of liberal trade policies, especially in more 
advanced countries. Lack of similar developments in many poor regions 
of the world has either prevented governments from opening up trade 
or has rendered local industries vulnerable to external shocks, imped-
ing investment and causing hardship for large parts of the population. 
For similar reasons, the pre-WWII free trade under colonial rule did not 
bring much prosperity to the Third World. 
This discussion raises the question of why many countries have 
managed to improve their governance and make globalization possible. 
Note that this is a central question because the developments in market 
institutions and technology ultimately depend on the capabilities of the 
government to establish an enabling environment for innovation and 
exchange. Also, it so happens that the full answer to this question has 
remained elusive. In fact, if we had a complete answer to this question, 
we could devise solutions to governance problems of all countries, and 
underdevelopment would be a problem of the past. Of course, we do 
have some insights regarding the sources of good governance in parts 
of the world. But our knowledge remains limited, and that is a major 
reason why spreading good governance has met with limited success. 
We know that good governance ultimately requires constraints on 
arbitrary rule, that is, separation of powers and checks and balances. We 
also know that there must be mechanisms to aggregate the demands and 
information of individuals and interest groups regarding what needs to 
be achieved through government policy. In addition, there must be pro-
cedures for assessing the performance of policymakers and rewarding 
them based on their success in delivering socially desirable policies. 
However, we don’t know which sets of rules and institutions can ensure 
these goals in each society and what the necessary steps are to imple-
ment them if the country has not already found a solution. In fact, prog-
ress in most societies has been made mostly through experiments and 
accidental discovery rather than fully analyzed designs. Typically, the 






or foreign rulers. The new institutions that have come about in those 
ways have often proved to be inadequate, either resulting in deteriora-
tion in governance or prompting further change. In some cases, such as 
with the United States, the vision of the leaders and the constellation of 
forces at the time have produced valuable and lasting results. In other 
situations, such as in Cambodia in the 1970s, the uprising has replaced 
one inadequate regime with another, far more arbitrary and destructive 
one. 
The difficulty societies have in attaining good governance lies in 
the complexity of the problems that they face. The governance rules 
and policies that work in each society must match a myriad of elements 
that comprise the society’s economic resources, culture, religion, group 
affiliations, and identities. For example, decentralization seems to have 
been a very positive force in China’s impressive economic growth. But 
in an economically underdeveloped, fragmented, and partially tribal 
society such as Pakistan, decentralization may strengthen clannish 
social relations that impede education and infrastructure and thereby 
deny most of the population the benefits of integration into national and 
global markets. 
Another major problem in reforming governance is the massive 
coordination effort that it requires: An overwhelming majority of the 
population must be convinced that the new rules being adopted are
likely to work and that everyone else shares the view that such a con-
sensus exists. This requirement also poses a dilemma: broad coordina-
tion often needs to be reached with the help of a charismatic leader or 
a well-organized group. Once in the coordinator position, the leader or 
the group may come to control the system and have the option to impose 
certain rules. This could defeat the purpose of the initial movement to 
bring about change. However, in some contexts, the dictatorship of the 
coordinator can be crucial in achieving reform, as in Korea, Taiwan, 
and Singapore, where the heavy hand of the ruling politicians in the 
initial stages has been associated with spectacular takeoffs. Absence of 
effective coordination, on the other hand, could undermine economic 
growth, as shown with the sharp drop in Indonesia’s economic growth 
after democratization in 1998 has shown. Note that these examples also 
suggest that in an underdeveloped country, governance improvement 
may come about under dictatorship, even though eventually economic 
development requires democratization. These observations, together 
 
 
The Challenges and Opportunities of 21st-Century Global Markets 109 
with the fact that the conditions of each society are complex and con-
stantly subject to change, highlight the reasons why governance reform 
has been so difficult in many countries and has remained an art rather 
than a science. 
Despite the difficulties in improving governance, there has been a 
gradual process of reform in a large part of the world, which has in 
turn facilitated international exchanges and has ushered in the current 
globalization episode. This process and its concomitant technologi-
cal and attitude changes have furthermore mounted pressure on other 
countries to change and adapt. When a country such as Myanmar does 
not respond, it becomes isolated and loses out on the tremendous ben-
efits that interaction with the rest of the world can offer. But simple 
responses, such as opening domestic markets to international trade, 
do not solve the problem either. Yemen’s economy, for example, has 
virtually stagnated since its trade liberalization in the mid-1990s. The 
government has been waiting for a surge in private investment to cre-
ate jobs and motivate the young to acquire education and skills, but the 
private sector has focused on imports rather than domestic production, 
doubting that the government’s policies would produce a skilled labor 
force and a buoyant demand for domestic goods. In any event, the chal-
lenges of globalization have increased the urgency of finding solutions 
to local economic and governance failures in all countries, and there is 
increasing realization that solutions need to be tailored to the specific 
conditions at the national and subnational levels. 
Although tailoring solutions may seem a reasonable and straight-
forward point, applying it in practice has not been easy for interna-
tional organizations. A vivid example of this was the response of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to a financial crisis in East Asia. In 
the 1990s, many East Asian countries had followed the advice of the 
IMF and opened up their economies to international finance. But due to 
regulatory weaknesses, many of those countries had attracted too much 
short-term foreign capital. When signs of economic weakness appeared 
in some of those economies in 1997–1998, foreign lenders withdrew 
their money and asset markets in East Asia collapsed. The solution to 
the problem should have been foreign support for regulatory reform in 
banking and finance, with governments maintaining their expenditures 
and allowing their deficits to rise as a means of cushioning the shock 
for the local population. The IMF offered assistance but conditioned it 
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on governments cutting their expenditures and bringing unnecessary 
hardship to those economies. The reason for the IMF’s condition was its 
past experience in many other developing countries where government 
deficits themselves had been a major culprit in causing or deepening 
financial crises. However, those conditions did not apply to East Asian 
countries in 1997–1998. The IMF failed to adjust its policies to specific 
conditions for three main reasons: 1) the situation was complex, and 
the right solution was not entirely obvious at the time; 2) allowing for 
variation in IMF policies would have opened the door to demands for 
exceptions in other cases where fiscal adjustment is indeed crucial; and 
3) since IMF managers did not believe that their organization could eas-
ily sort out different cases, they must have felt that allowing for varia-
tion could undermine the IMF’s internal discipline. 
The need for diversity of solutions across places has posed a prob-
lem for global markets. It has meant that in the economic game, the 
world is not completely flat, as Thomas Friedman (2005) would sug-
gest. Labor regulations, for example, have to take account of local cir-
cumstances in terms of social and family structure, formal insurance 
options, work habits, legal systems, etc. Similarly, environmental regu-
lations have reflected the priorities of the populations across places and 
their abilities to turn their concerns into policies. Multilateral organi-
zations such as the IMF and the World Bank tried to devise uniform 
recommendations to facilitate their own decision-making processes, 
and multinationals have shown preference for uniform and permissive 
regulations that reduce their costs of operation. But the people in many 
localities have been reluctant or unable to adapt, resulting in an uneven 
distribution of global economic activity. 
To sum up, the past trends in globalization have consisted of
greater integration of world markets with the help of technological 
progress and policy changes across countries. However, the result has 
been uneven, with or without efforts to impose uniform solutions. The 
question is, what should we expect for the trends in the coming decades 
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THE COMING TRENDs 
In the past, while technological developments have generally con-
tributed to increased integration of world markets, institutional factors
—basic norms and rules such as culture and constitution—have not 
always been as supportive. Also, technologies embodied in physical 
capital have been relatively easy to transfer across countries, whereas
the replication of institutions and intangible technologies such as man-
agement has faced greater obstacles. However, there is increasing real-
ization among policy analysts as well as policymakers the world over 
that some essential lessons from each country’s experience must be 
transferable to others if careful attention is paid to the conditions and 
nuances. The consequences of this realization will likely set the trends 
in globalization during the coming decades. Cross-country lessons will 
be increasingly distilled to arrive at general messages, along with a host 
of ifs and buts and examples for potential application in specific cir-
cumstances. This is likely to yield more practical ideas for governance 
reform with minimal risk, hence further lowering the institutional bar-
riers to globalization. 
The policy reforms of the coming decades are unlikely to make 
countries uniform in terms of governance and regulation, but they will 
bring about greater harmony. They will enable countries to participate 
in global processes and cooperate in establishing effective international 
treaties and organizations that enhance fair and broad competition. At 
the same time, diversity in institutions and regulatory systems is likely 
to remain. Although this may entail some costs for business, it will also 
serve as a source of strength for the global economy. Country differ-
ences can increase the range of options available in terms of products 
and processes, allowing better potential fit between production require-
ments and consumers. Indeed, markets will reaffirm their great ability 
to bring harmony to the diverse set of actors working differentiated con-
ditions. And this will increase the resilience of the world economy in 
the face of unforeseen shocks, for exactly the same reasons that diver-
sity in biology ensures longevity of species. 
As the means to establish and harmonize situation-specific solu-
tions proliferate, decentralization will become a more tangible reality 
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materialization of deeper democratic rule. These and all other reforms 
and adaptations at the local level are likely to strengthen and broaden 
the participation of national and subnational governments in form-
ing the institutions of global governance (such as the United Nations, 
the World Trade Organization, the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank of 
International Settlements, and the World Court). Rather than preaching 
uniformity, as the World Bank and IMF have often done in the past, 
international institutions will increasingly move toward a role parallel 
to that of markets: bringing harmony to a diverse set of players. 
How will governments and markets deal with our current concerns 
about globalization? To explore the possible answers to this question, 
let’s start with the outsourcing issue, which has caused some anxiety 
in recent years for workers and professionals in many countries. This 
also happens to be among the easiest issues to address. To understand 
the reason, first note that outsourcing will be going in all directions. So, 
if some jobs are lost in the United States and outsourced to countries 
where they can be done relatively more cheaply, there must also be 
other tasks that are relatively more expensive in those countries and 
can be outsourced to the United States. Would this type of global com-
petition press down the U.S. wages and salaries toward those currently 
prevailing in India or China? Not if American workers win the compe-
tition in their fields of specialization because of their productivity and 
high quality of their services. Of course, this cannot happen in all lines 
of economic activity. So, over time, part of the American labor force 
may have to shift to new jobs as its comparative advantage is redefined 
by global markets. Continued improvements in the labor market will 
reduce the costs associated with the shift, and the remaining burden is 
likely to be cushioned with the help of well-functioning private capital 
and insurance markets, as well as social insurance mechanisms. Similar 
trends will also be taking place in the rest of the world. In many devel-
oping countries, where the costs of adjustment have been falling mostly 
on labor, there will be further institution building to diminish the hard-
ships and share the risks. All of these effects will soften the opposition 
to liberal trade around the world and thereby deepen globalization. 
Another current concern about globalization is the rising inequal-
ity. Globalization has increased the returns to skills and, as a result, has 
widened the gap between the rich and the poor. This is parallel to the 
effects of technological and institutional changes, which have in fact 
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been much stronger forces behind the increased inequality. These forces 
will continue raising the rewards to skills, largely because ultimately 
that is how they help incomes rise. However, the level and composi-
tion of skills are likely to change, enabling a much larger share of the 
labor force to take advantage of opportunities presented by globaliza-
tion and new technologies. The enhanced abilities of the governments 
will also bring about more efficient, situation-specific labor regulations 
that expand rewarding job opportunities for broader segments of the 
population around the world. These factors should jointly help to stop 
or even to reverse the recent trends in inequality. 
Of course, for the enhancement and expansion in skills to take 
place, there must be major reforms in education (especially curricula 
and teaching methods) to facilitate the acquisition of the relevant skills. 
There will be better ways to condense information in various fields and 
pass them on to students, along with more general skills of communi-
cations and critical thinking. Like many other reforms, at the moment 
we may not know the exact solutions that will come about in differ-
ent contexts, but our efforts to improve knowledge in this area and to 
experiment with possible solutions are likely to bear fruit over the com-
ing decades. 
Could the rise in global incomes be thwarted by the exhaustion of 
natural resources on earth? While that is a possibility, it is by no means 
a likely outcome. The incentives to find renewable and expandable sub-
stitutes for exhaustible resources are getting stronger. There are already 
such substitutes available for many natural resources, though they are 
not always used widely due to cost or safety consideration (such as 
nuclear energy, which can be a substitute for petroleum). Another factor 
that makes the picture more hopeful is the shift in the pattern of produc-
tion and consumption toward products that use fewer natural resources 
per dollar of their value. This trend is most vivid in the rising role of 
services in the economy, which require substantially less energy than 
manufacturing and agriculture. Similar trends, combined with institu-
tional reforms in developing countries, are likely to address the envi-
ronmental concerns of expanding production around the globe. 
Similar responses and trends should be expected in the case of many 
other problems associated with globalization. The overall picture seems 
to be a hopeful one, largely based on the ability of the world commu-
nity to overcome the most pressing obstacle to its economic prosperity 
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at present, which is lack of sufficient knowledge and ability to spread 
good practices in governance, regulation, and market development. 
WHAT COMBINATIONs OF skILLs DO WE NEED IN THE
TWENTy-FIRsT CENTuRy? 
There will be no shortage of decent jobs in the coming decades. To 
enjoy a prosperous life, people need, among other things, good shelter, 
food, medical care, education, and entertainment. Those who deliver 
these products need to identify the demands and satisfy them with high 
standards and low costs. To achieve this, they need high-quality and 
cost-effective inputs, which must be produced by others, who in turn 
depend on each other’s products and services.1 An important part of the 
inputs needed at every stage is the innovative know-how to perform 
tasks more effectively and improve the output. Furthermore, those who 
provide such inputs will need the services of others who offer research 
and advice on how innovation processes can themselves be made more 
effective and innovative. At every stage, there is also a need for indi-
viduals who can facilitate the transactions and make them more reli-
able. Finally, there is a need for people who study the global system of 
transactions at broader levels and help make it more effective. It is evi-
dent that in its entirety, this chain is very complex and, with globaliza-
tion, spans the entire world economy, involving billions of jobs. Each 
of those jobs can be made more productive and remunerative, which 
will benefit the jobholders as well as all others who interact with them 
as buyers or sellers. 
In this context, the skills that one can acquire and use productively 
in each country depend on the production processes already in place 
and the institutional capabilities of that country. For example, in the 
past, the conditions in the United States enabled it to lead in the devel-
opment of new knowledge, technologies, and products (ranging from 
scientific and industrial equipment to music and cinema). This position 
is likely to be maintained in the first half of the twenty-first century, 
and the skills most rewarded will be those that contribute to innova-
tions. Of course, competition will increase around the world. But as 
the numbers of those involved in the process rise, there will be room 
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for greater specialization and focus on narrower areas where leadership 
can be maintained, with some of the activities being passed on to other 
countries that can perform them more effectively. This will make the 
jobs more productive in the United States and in other countries, raising 
incomes here and abroad. 
Finally, to be effective in our jobs, we need to specialize in the tasks 
that we take up, communicate effectively with those who interact with 
us, and develop a practical and reasonably good understanding of the 
big picture of the global economy. At the same time, we must maintain 
some flexibility to be able to redefine our positions, learn new skills, 
and switch to new tasks as our sources of comparative advantage shift 
over time. This requires a combination of quantitative and technical 
knowledge as well as communication and business skills. Many of the 
specialized skills may be learned on the job or at the graduate level. In 
pregraduate stages of education, we need to learn a great deal of rela-
tively general math and sciences as well as social sciences and human-
ities. And, of course, in all these areas, our knowledge must include 
broad perspectives on where things stand globally. 
Note 
1. For example, to paint the rooms in your house, you need a painter to do a neat job 
while spending a minimal amount of time. This depends on the skills and incen-
tives of the painter, as well as the equipment and the quality of paints she can use. 
In particular, she needs durable brushes and painting equipment that spread paint 
quickly and consistently. Producing such equipment and material in turn requires 
use of appropriate inputs and the application of scientific and industrial innova-
tions, which are produced by others, and so on and so forth. 
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